Meeting illogic with illogic

I was somewhat enraged by this poster, which I think illustrates something

on many levels. Apart from anything else, if you try and make constructive comments on feminism, the post-feminists and other rubbish comes out of the woodwork.

But in particular it illustrates the false assumption that if you focus on one thing in one situation, this is a negative statement about other situations. Take for example:

Feminist: Men shouldn’t rape women.

Humanist: People shouldn’t rape people.

Are we to assume women are indifferent to men being raped? Absolutely not. They might be the first to offer advice.

When we hear the clamours of Fathers for Justice, can we assume that they are indifferent to justice for mothers? Er, well... we may not be entitled to assume that, but one is very inclined to think this is the case.

Essentially we jump to conclusions that reinforce what we already believe.

And I am going to jump to the conclusion that the author doesn’t respect women.

I think feminists are right to focus on disrespect for women. Women don’t get enough and in ways men get too much. Unfortunately, while it is sometimes intuitively clear, sometimes it is far from clear what respect consists of. There was a time when it was felt to be sexist to say women should have greater representation in Parliament and on company boards because they have something special to offer.

Nowadays this is regarded more positively. Provided of course that focussing on this doesn’t imply we ignore other more ‘mainstream’ contributions they might make.

Martin Prior

Are the ’isms now wasms?

A note on Soo Tian Lee’s article on –isms.

At the time of the Molotov-Rippentrop Pact in 1939 (no I wasn’t there!), between the Nazis and Stalin, a sadly unnamed wit in the British Foreign Office observed “All the Isms are now Wasms”. If we feel this today, we might well feel like saying that “I am an Ism-free Zone.” But perhaps they are merely pragmatic... or perhaps they are not even that.

Now, some time before Issue 34, before we indicated the issue articles belonged, Soo Tian Lee wrote On the Claim of Not Being an ‘-ist’ of Any Sort. In this he stated:

My view on this is quite simple: to claim that one is not an ‘-ist’ (or an ‘-ian’, an ‘-ive’, or whatever suffix one uses) is to hide from oneself and (some) others the views that one really does hold. And the danger with this is that quite often, these views will just be rather mainstream and, quite possibly, rather centrist. In other words, the dominant strands of political thought that are the building blocks of one’s political viewpoint will be the ones that are widely accepted and transmitted through newspapers, popular film and music, random conversations on the bus, and so on. For example, I have never met a post-political person who did not think that capitalism is the least objectionable (if not the best) way to organise society. Neither have I met a post-political person who objected to society being organised according to hierarchical structures. In both these cases, there were political beliefs behind these opinions, namely supporting capitalism and believing in formalised leadership. But these political beliefs were hidden by claims which rejected ‘politics of the old sort’, claims which acted as a fig leaf that covered the nakedness of the post-political position.

In fact my very first article in this Newsletter, way back in 2011, was to be a reply to this perception, but I was told to write about ‘Love’ instead. Which I did, but I wasn’t to be outdid: my article was entitled Love: the ultimate -ism!

In fact I think we can turn to the prevailing analyses of modern logic, which deals in strong and weak operators. I gave a hit of this in Love: the ultimate -ism, when I contrasted

with

this latter being an example of a weak modal operator.

What is the difference between a strong and weak operator: if X is possible, this means that non-X is not necessary. Like if Y is permissible, then not doing Y is not obligatory.

So when people say they don’t have any –isms, they should mean they don’t believe in anti-capitalism. This does not in fact strictly mean they believe in capitalism, but if capitalists are going to abuse the trust-by-default of these people, it is sufficient that they have a weak belief in capitalism.

So if I do not believe in the activities of Iain Duncan Smith, if I have no strong belief they are wrong, then in effect I weakly believe that his actions are right.

Surely you don’t believe in scroungers? Or DO you?

Martin Prior

Philosophy Takeaway Newsletter 64

Homophobia, Intuition and Logic II

I was pleasantly surprised when 'Homophobia, Intuition and Logic' got into the Philosophy Takeaway magazine, and I was interested in the comments. I did indeed speculate as to how and why societies might turn to homophobia. In the article I started by looking at what ethics might say:

1. Social liberalism: gays are OK, they should be free to do as they wish provided nobody else suffers, and who else suffers apart from homophobes, who are really suffering from their own prejudices rather than homosexuality?
2. Universalisation: what would happen if everybody ‘did it’? The human race would not survive.
3. The Golden Rule: do unto others as you would have them do unto you. Naturally… if I were gay I would expect them to bash me. [really?]
4. The ethics is nought, homosexuality is a sin… like abortion is murder, and some say corporal punishment is violence and pornography is violence.

And much of what I discussed looked partly at why innate homosexuality might evolve and how homophobia could be linked in with constraints on heterosexual relationships. We must now have a number (v) argument:

5. The frying-pan argument: the relevant physical organs are not made for homosexual activity – likewise you don’t use a frying-pan to boil water.

Maybe you could call this the utility argument: I prefer the ‘frying-pan’ term, and one of my readers agreed, perhaps with undue prompting, that it was really the universalisation argument.

Well in fact if I am using my pot to slow-cook my kleftiko, I am not going to rush out and buy, borrow or steal another pot for a quick cuppa because using a pan disobeys a utility rule – let alone the frying-pan rule. Although if I have servants, getting such an implement is what they are for.

There are two issues I would like to raise, one is whether gay or bi is nature or nurture, and secondly, how to uphold monogamy you may well try and stigmatize the ‘left-overs’.

Is gay/bi nature or nurture? I would say both, and the nature addresses long-term considerations. If over a long period of time, there is a surplus of women, a society will be more harmonious if there is a significant proportion of gay women. Likewise for men. But to address short-term variation, there will be nurture. And probably this will depend on the gender ratio of the people surrounding a child in its early years. And bisexuality also helps to address short-term variation in the gender or sex balance.

But coming to another issue: how far do stigmatising, phobia and the like help society counteract nature and nurture in a harmful way? Clearly when missionaries introduce monogamy to societies where there is a surplus of women, this is likely to cause pressure against men to not prefer their own, and also creates a lot of lonely women, possibly mothers, unless there is bisexuality among women, which missionaries are not that likely to encourage.

And similar distorting effects occur with female infanticide in places like India, where the resulting surplus of men almost certainly leads to New Delhi being described by some as the ‘rape capital of the world’.

So perhaps, ethical intervention should only occur for consent and against deception.

And in our own society, the monogamous heterosexual – and fully clothed – model is upheld. But it is mathematically impossible for everyone to achieve this ideal, not least if there is also an imbalance in homosexuality. So we stigmatise prostitution and pornography as well as adultery. To my mind it is the sexual imbalance, rather a male desire to exert power over women, that drives pursuits such as prostitution and pornography, and neither in themselves involves deception and lack of consent, except to counter-act the stigmatization.

And we can only address problems by recognising causes: ban Page Three maybe, but regulate activity and don’t thrust it on other people.

Martin Prior

Philosophy Takeaway Newsletter 62

A note on why one should not necessarily like 'like'

Normally one puts a title in capitals, but no, I’m not talking about Liking, like in Facebook, but the adverb. And I am partly prompted by a petition that came to my Inbox, saying ‘Keep Page Three’. Basically sex workers fighting to keep their jobs. As I said in the Philosophy Takeaway 'Gender' Issue 38, on “Sexism, Logic and Intuition II”:

“I don’t believe in banning Page Three: if in our idealistic monogamous society the numbers don’t match, let the remainder of dividing by two pursue their needs privately and unobtrusively, perhaps towards the end of the paper.”

Now why should one not necessarily like ‘like’? Basically it is ambiguous between ‘like in some respects’ and ‘like in all respects’. I shall give some examples, the first from the above mentioned article:

“Let us know get to the substance of the issue: certain activities are regarded as ‘treating women as objects’. Well firstly, an argument condemning activity between consenting adults on the basis of a simile is a very questionable ethical argument. Many things have a resemblance to something else: if I lift somebody up from the floor, in a sense I am treating somebody as an object, so one must go directly to the basis of the similarity that causes concern.”

But you are only treating people as objects in some respects, and as I say further in this paper and in Part I, it is the manner in which it is done and the disrespect with which it is done, not the fact of doing it. So if we express it proportionally, we might have something like

contests:women :: people:objects

this is a useful way of expressing many instances of ‘like’, but it is not necessary, for example, if John looks like his mother. However the remainder of the examples can be fitted into this form, and I shall use these as sub-headings.

Chancellor:economy :: housewife:household

Another important ‘like’: our economy is like a household, you always have to balance the books, and if they don’t balance, you must cut your cloth. Well aggregates are always like their components... in certain respects. Thus flocks of sheep are like sheep, in certain respects. Sheep undoubtedly say “maa’aa’aaa”, but do flocks?

Well, both economies and households must pursue their goals in an efficient manner. But is an ‘efficient manner’ the same for the whole and its parts. Now both must make ends meet in the long run. And a household may well have to cut its cloth in the long-term. But a national economy can print money!!!

Now if you feel that an economy and a household are alike in all respects, then clearly Mr Osborne should go to jail. Indeed so should Gordon Brown a long time ago. But in certain situations it is more efficient than austerity to clear a deficit by printing money. So when two things are alike in some respects, they may be unlike in other respects, for example their efficient functioning.

Vice-chancellor:university :: manager:business

Professors have of late an additional burden to their already over-worked commitments: vice-chancellors sailing in/parachuted in from the business world. Now of course nobody should use two paper-clips when one suffices. But the idea is very vague, and I would wish to have a chat with the professor of business studies: in all likelihood the new Vice-Chancellor wants us to worship at the altar of business.

This means paying VCs an exorbitant salary to ‘attract them from industry’ and suspending left-wing students and/or lecturers on the pretext of some sort of ‘inefficiency’. And closing down departments whose subject business doesn’t understand: or merge them, for example fine arts with paint and dye technology. Obviously painting pictures is like painting doors, so let us open doors to the real world.

So we treat ‘like’ like we want. Finally, some rather controversial current affairs:

Jews:Palestinians :: Nazis:Jews

Another example is the frequent comparison of Israeli treatment of Palestinian with Nazi activities. This causes considerable indignation: the Israelis have never sent people to gas chambers. Again they are not alike in all respects, but in enough respects for it to be unacceptable. – so the argument goes.

Israelis:Palestinians :: Apartheid:nie-blankes

And many former victims of Apartheid say that Palestine makes the Apartheid system look like a Sunday picnic. Be that as it may, but it is not like a Sunday picnic in all respects.

Martin Prior

From the Philosophy Takeaway Newsletter 56

Correctness, Intuition and Logic - By Martin Prior

Correctness, Intuition and Logic

About a week ago I commented on a newspaper report from North Lanarkshire, one of the Labour-controlled councils in Scotland where STV is used, a form of proportional representation.

The council had axed an annual taxi outing for children with special needs.  The Monklands Taxi Drivers’ Outing had been running for almost 40 years – but North Lanarkshire Council halted the yearly fancy dress road trip.  According to them, such outings didn’t “fit in with current thinking on inclusion and equality and that parading children with additional support needs is inappropriate.”

To my mind, thinking is merely thinking, and that formulating such hypotheses is an initial stage.  Indeed one can say that inclusion and separate activities are not mutually exclusive. I have written before about the importance of the intuitions of the people for whom political correctness is supposed to benefit.  People who speak an accent, say Indian, have an intuitive judgement as to whether an attempt at an Indian accent is racist.  I for example have no objection to the metaphor ‘short-sighted’, for example our government’s short-sighted attitude toward climate change.  If somebody who was not short-sighted tried to tell me how I should react to such a metaphor, my intuition would be that they were bloody patronising and the only reason I didn’t thump them was because my glasses might get broken.

When such people try to be logical, they often use emotive and subjective terms, often in situations where it is not ‘either... or’.  Using the term short-sighted in a derogatory context supposedly tells short-sighted people they are inferior.  Not when we have glasses and choose to use them, which the metaphorical short-sighted do not.

Attempting to be politically correct can only be meaningful if you listen to those you are trying to help, and are ready to learn from their intuitions.  And indeed inclusion does not exclude separateness, when of course neither is imposed.

Martin Prior

The Philosophy Takeaway Issue 53 'Open Topic'

Liberalism III: liberal versus conservative practicioners - By Martin Prior

Liberalism III: liberal versus conservative practicioners

In my last article on liberalism, Liberalism: from Philosophers to Society? I surveyed a number of philosophers, with the view of seeing how far they could be a new concept, social liberalism. Adam Smith basically added the social – and economic - dimension with his Wealth of Nations, and his formalisation of a laissez-faire economics.  But he urged the abolition of slavery.  

John Stuart Mill is seen as the father of Social Liberalism, and is noted for his marriage of utilitarianism and this concept of social liberalism.  But his predecessor Jeremy Bentham (England, 1748-1832) set the path.  It should be noted that Bentham [according to Wikipedia] “demanded economic and individual freedom, including the separation of the state and church, freedom of expression, completely equal rights for women, the end of slavery and colonialism, uniform democracy, the abolition of physical punishment, also on children, the right for divorce, free prices, free trade and no restrictions on interest.”  But nevertheless he was not an economic liberal or libertarian, urging government intervention in the form of restrictions on monopoly power, pensions, health insurance and other social security.

Now here we have a liberal who is unlike the self-styled liberals who followed him: he rejected colonialism and laissez-faire, whereas among modern politicians, liberalism differs from conservatism in the way these are implemented, even if they are now called the market economy and neo-colonialism.  Here we come back to socialism, which as I argued, sometimes equated to non-economic liberalism, and sometimes to an economic liberalism termed the ‘social market economy’, which I rejected.

I stated:

When we move from philosophies to politics, we move into an area where I believe we must look into the political adherents’ motivations in terms of their part in patterns of exploitation.  And in the developed countries, this really means thieves squabbling over the booty from exploitation of the Third World.  This issue is in no way addressed by social marketers and mainstream social democrats.

So, as I argued, regardless of the self-image of liberals and conservatives, we must consider their behaviour in practice among leading world powers.  The liberals, or in former days the Whigs, were smart at advancing power and making tactical retreats.  A notable example of their callousness when in a position of advance is in 1846, when Lord Russell succeeded Sir Robert Peel.  Peel, originally a Tory, repealed the Corn Laws which protected British agriculture in good times, but in times of food shortages exacerbated them.  In 1846, Lord Russell took over, heading a free trade government with Peelite support, but now extended free trade to outright laissez-faire, and refused to intervene in the market to ease the Great Potato Famine (roughly 1845-52).

Here the Tories appeared more humane than the laissez-faire Whigs, not least in the writings of Benjamin Disraeli (PM 1868 and 1874-1880).  However a generation after the Famine, when the Irish were becoming more militant, William Ewart Gladstone  (PM 1868-1874,1880-5, 1886, 1892-4) realised that Home Rule was inevitable.  This realisation came in 1886, and triggered the critical divide between Liberals and ‘Unionists’ (Conservatives and Liberal Unionists): the Liberals believed in strategic advance and withdrawal, whereas the Conservatives were slow to advance, but under Disraeli and his successors, staunchly adhered to a policy of ‘what we have we hold’.  Disraeli strongly celebrated Imperialism, making Victoria Empress of India, and his successors, notably Salisbury, resisted any loosening of the British hold on Ireland.  They felt that concessions led to a slippery slope which would to the dissolution of Empire.  They could not find a flexible approach, drawing on the fact that Irish , both Catholic and protestant, had no objection to being part of Empire.

This leads me to an analysis of liberals and conservatives behaviour, regardless of their self-image.  Basically we see an interaction of culture and power:

LIBERALS, the flexible exploiters	TORIES, hanging on to what they’ve got
(i)             Centre: culture of exploiters, (ii)            Skills and technology of exploiters(pink) (iii)           Superior power (blue), (iv)          Ignorance and fear of the exploited (grey), (v)           Culture of exploited (vi)          Wi(l)der environment.	(i)             Centre: culture of exploiters, (ii)            Ignorance and fear among exploiters(grey) (iii)           Superior power of exploiters(blue), (iv)          Skills and technology (e.g. military) used against the exploited(pink), (v)           Culture of exploited (vi)          Wi(l)der environment.

Note the contrast: the liberals value and develop their skills, and are quite ready to create empires and ‘neo-colonies’, which take advantage of their targets’ ignorance and often fear.  The approach of the Tories, with whom conservatism is an asset, is to frighten would-be supporters into loyalty, playing on ignorance and fear.  This rather than technology is their power base, but despite its shaky nature, they will resort to force against their opponents rather than persuasion.

So in the two diagrams, the pink and the grey are switched round.

Martin Prior

The Philosophy Takeaway Issue 52 'Open Topic'

Fuzzy Logic and the Multicultural Society - Martin Prior

Fuzzy Logic and the Multicultural Society

Take Giles FitzPatrick (randomly chosen name).  Is he posh?  Yes or no?  And Violet Smith (also  randomly chosen name).  Is she?  Yes or no?  Well, actually, having met both of them, yes AND no.

Well, various logicians have invented three-valued logics, and a non-logician like myself has invented five (so there!)  But those who believe in fuzzy logic believe in an infinite number of truth-values, ranging in a continuum between 0 and 1.  Although there have been perfectly respectable exercises using fuzzy logic in the form of computer algorithms logicians like the renowned Jan Łukasiewicz (1878-1956) worked on this idea as far back as the ’twenties.

As an example of such an algorithm given in Wikipedia for FL:

For example, a simple temperature regulator that uses a fan might look like this:

IF temperature IS very cold THEN stop fan

IF temperature IS cold THEN turn down fan

IF temperature IS normal THEN maintain level

IF temperature IS hot THEN speed up fan

There is no "ELSE" – all of the rules are evaluated, because the temperature might be "cold" and "normal" at the same time to different degrees.

In fact, in order to make a decision, one has to reduce each test to a yes/no test.

To my mind, truth corresponds to the facts, and fuzzy truth corresponds to perception of the facts.

Well, what about the multicultural society?  Do we have it?  Is it a good thing?  Er, yes and no.

When David Cameron tries to say the Multi-cultural Society is not working he may be saying more than he thinks.  There is indeed a Multi-cultural Society already, which has been here for a long time: the class system.  Is he making it work?  Yes or no?  Now if DC is 85% posh, this is captured in fuzzy set theory: he is 85% part of the ‘posh fuzzy set’ – and indeed 15% part of the non-posh fuzzy set!  And what we find from London up the east coast, the class divide is sharper than elsewhere in England.  And elsewhere in the English-speaking world, divisions are much more blurred. 

So in this respect we do not want a multi-cultural society, but rather a vari-cultural society, rather like those vari-focals.

To my mind this also applies to variations based on ethnic divisions.  Let us not fan doubts on the Multi-cultural Society, and let a vari-cultural society – with continua rather than sharp boundaries - happen without the heat.

And of course those of us who 51% earn our living be 51% proud of being working-class.

Martin Prior

The Philosophy Takeaway Issue 49 'Open Topic'

Mrs Thatcher: intuition vs logic, liberal vs conservative - By Martin Prior

If I were to do a one-page obituary of the ‘good’ lady, what would I say?  Many people would argue that Mrs Thatcher saved the country from the unions, and perhaps make mention of privatisation and monetarism.  In fact when people praise Thatcher - apart from those in Eastern Europe - they generally say that she suppressed the power of the unions when these latter were ruining the country. 

 

But others would say she did not in fact save the country: she saved it for the bankers, and the unions were simply trying to protect the workers from the banks: for nearly 25 years working people bore the brunt of ruinous economic policies such as keeping up the value of sterling, and acquiescing in terms dictated by the IMF, most notoriously in 1976.  And thus workers, through their unions, were in a militant mood.  And indeed they would say, rather than address the flawed economics creating this situation, Thatcher brought in doctrines to perpetuate what was basically in decline.

Art - By Martin Prior

This weeks artist-logician was Martin Prior: http://martinse.livejournal.com/

 

The Philosophy Takeaway 'Logic' Issue 45

What is logic? - By Ellese Elliott

What is logic?

Logic is hidden behind every conversation, joke, story or argument.  Logic is necessary in order to be able to have an understandable form of communication.  Without it, conversation, jokes, stories or arguments could not take place.

Aristotle was a famous old bloke from Ancient Greece who thought a lot about a lot of stuff, but most importantly, for this subject, he thought about thought; what it was and how it takes place. He said that thought has laws. There are rules which enable the process of thinking to happen. The most crucial law of thought is the law of identity. The law of identity states that:

                                                     A = A. 

The equals sign is another way of saying the same as.  Anything can be put in the place of ‘A’.  For example, 'A = A' can stand for ‘that orange’ is ‘that orange’,’ you’ are ‘you’ and ‘logic’ is ‘logic’. This means that a thing is identical with itself.

 
The other thing that Aristotle said was that if it follows that if everything is the same with itself and that this is a law, then it cannot be a contradiction. This thought is expressed in the law of non-contradiction.  It cannot be that:

                                      

    ORANGE = NOT ORANGE

 

We cannot think this orange is both an orange and not an orange. Let’s put this in a scenario:  let’s say you and your mate Kinglsy arranged to go out on the pull. You both agreed to meet outside Tottenham Court road tube station at 10:00pm.

You are standing there, it’s pouring down with rain and Kingsly isn’t there. You try calling him, but it’s forwarding to 02 voicemail and taking your last bit of credit and your thinking, ‘I hope this twat has got a good reason why I’ve been standing here for half an hour like a mug in the rain.’  He turns up causally at 11.00pm. You’re very angry, so you say, “Where the hell have you been?”

Kingsly says, “Mate, by 10.00 pm I did mean 10.00 pm, but I didn’t mean 10.00 pm and I meant 11.00pm. Do you know what I mean? “ 

This is an example of a contradiction and is not a reason at all, let alone a good one.  When we are met with a contradiction we are just utterly confused. We have to ask, “Kingsly what the hell are you on about?” Kingsly then goes on to say some other nonsense because he has taken acid. Kingsly is no longer using the laws of identity to express himself. This raises an important point as it doesn’t matter how logical you are being if the other person is being illogical, a conversation cannot take place.

Now, it seems pretty obvious that things are what they are and are not what they are not. Therefore, when we talk about whether an object is either an orange or not orange, whether it is either 10.00pm or not 10.00pm, we are referring to the last law of thought called the law of excluded middle.  An example is as follows:

I am a human being

Or

I am not a human being.

One of these statements has to be true. However, they cannot both be true or they cannot both be false.  When Aristotle thought about the laws of thought thousands of years ago, he realised that human beings cannot think outside of these laws. As a last exercise, try it yourself. Can you think of an orange and not an orange, which are both properties of the same thing? Can you understand what Kingsly means by 10.00pm and not 10.00pm? Or do you think it is true that you are a human and not a human?

If you could think of any of these things you may have a hard time explaining it.....

Ellese Elliott

The Philosophy Takeaway 'Logic' Issue 45

The limits of logic: By the philosophical Prometheus, Samuel Mack-Poole

The limits of logic:

The purpose of this piece, though explicit in the title, and implicit throughout, is to argue that logic is rather limited. As such, it makes little logical sense to view the world within a narrow logical sphere.

Once, when engaged in conversation at The Philosophy Takeaway’s stall with none other than the mathematical genius that is Dmitry Dereshev, I was drawn into a debate regarding how useful emotions are. The conversation -- as far is my fallible memory can recall – went a little like this:

DD: I do not see how emotions are useful. They are, to be honest, a waste of time.

SMP: Yet, if we are forced to experience emotions, doesn’t it make sense to understand them?

Having thought about this, I have to say that the latter statement can only be true. There are a couple of trite archetypes that come to mind: firstly, we have the autistic genius. He or she can understand particle physics, but when it comes to maintaining friendships, is proved to be woefully inadequate. Conversely, we have the overly emotional artist who is so dominated by their emotion that they are blinded by it.  However, if they were given something highly logical to do, they would be flummoxed.

Therefore, it is clear that when it comes to the human condition, balance is essential.

Thus, when it comes to philosophy, should we be obsessed with logic? Isn’t philosophy, by definition, about wisdom, rather than logic? If we are obsessed with logic, are we in fact illogical?

A notable example of the limitations of logic is the liar paradox.  I’ve written about this before, but it is applicable in the context of this article. A liar paradox is a sentence that carries a contradictory binary truth. An example of this is as follows: All men are liars. St Jerome elaborated upon this:

“I said in my alarm, 'Every man is a liar!' "(Psalm. 116:10) Is David telling the truth or is he lying? If it is true that every man is a liar, and David's statement, "Every man is a liar" is true, then David also is lying; he, too, is a man. But if he, too, is lying, his statement: "Every man is a liar," consequently is not true. Whatever way you turn the proposition, the conclusion is a contradiction. Since David himself is a man, it follows that he also is lying; but if he is lying because every man is a liar, his lying is of a different sort.”

Moving away from the liar paradox, I’m sure we’ve all met a very persuasive sophist in our lives. I use the word in the modern, sense. A sophist can be defined as: a person who uses a specious argument for deceiving someone.  In a truly modern context, one may call such a person a rhetorician. Such a person may be very skilled at making arguments. Despite the fact that the arguments are linguistically sound, they can often fly in the face of the truth.

A modern example of sophistry has been committed by Jeremy Hunt, the secretary for health. He is, of course, a member of the current Conservative-dominated government. Although the term of sophist is applicable to many politicians, Hunt’s words on the closure of Lewisham Hospital really are a shining example of sophistry.  He stated that his plans will deliver “better clinical services”. This is, quite obviously, a dubious statement to make in the light of the facts. Closing a hospital in Lewisham, and then telling people to go to Queen Elizabeth Hospital in Woolwich is in no way an improvement of local services.  Moreover, it seems like a harrowing example of Orwellian doublethink.

Another notable example of logic being limited is through its perfection against itself. If two opposing arguments are equally logical, what are we to think? If two of The Philosophy Takeaway’s finest philosophers wrote an essay about the ethics of advertising, with one pro-advertising and the other anti, I’m sure both could include equally logical, non-contradictory and sound arguments.

So, if we are, as philosophers, confronted with arguments that are equally logical, how do we proceed in making our decisions? It seems that life experience, intuition and emotion all play a part. Or, more concisely, we use wisdom.

A quote from Pascal -- yes the very same Pascal who (sorry for the pun) coined Pascal’s wager -- is of extreme salience in the context of this article. Pascal once stated, “The heart has reasons of which reason is ignorant.”  I do wonder if emotions and logic have to be at odds. Can they not be used to aid each other, instead? 

Please don’t think I have been attacking logic, as that has not been my goal. The purpose of this article has been to demonstrate the limits that logic has. If logic, however beautiful and profound, is so limited, should it be put on such a pedestal?  To do so, it seems, would be unwise, and, ultimately, against the very essence of philosophy.

By the philosophical Prometheus, Samuel Mack-Poole

The Philosophy Takeaway 'Logic' Issue 45

The Board game: Social Logic - By Selim 'Selim' Talat

The Board game: Social Logic

The board game is the height of human interaction. It is the ultimate defense against boredom and blandness, standing up there with the icelandic family huddled around the fire, recounting their imaginative sagas. It is as powerful as the very idea of narratives and stories which will always remain in our human psyche. The board game, for all of it's development throughout the millennia, is nothing more than the very primitive experience of the hearth, around which are gathered friends or family. On top of all this, it is also tapping into that most fundamental human experience - intelligent games and play. A board game is a complete experience of touch, sight and smell (mmm, cardboard!). It is quite a shame taste has not yet been incorporated yet, but I am sure it is on its way. This is a combination of 'nature', here defined as direct sensory experience, and 'civilisation', the abstract higher-reasoning of logic and imagination.

You must meet the board game half way, becoming engrossed within its artificial world, for most of the time it is not given to you on a plate. Yet nothing feels more natural than immersion, that unique ability we have to turn little bits of cardboard, plastic and a few dice into something active, and dare I say it - alive. Hanging over the pieces, so simple in our world of microchips, electronics and engineering genius, are the rules. These are laws which are to be placed on top of the physical aspects of the game world like a sheet of snow. They are entirely imaginary, abstract laws which must be interpreted and then applied to make the pieces move and carry out the objectives (it's quite an obvious thing to say really, but then again my level of philosophy is often just stating the obvious!). We become so accustomed to the rules being part of the physical aspects of the game that we come to associate the knight with his leap, the queen with her multi-directional fury, the bishop with diagonality, and so on. These moves are contained not in the actual pieces themselves, but are completely separate, operating in a world of logic within our minds. Nowhere in life can we be more assured of purpose and function then upon the board, where disputes still arise, yet an appeal to logic and a powerful code of 'ethics' can be drawn upon! It is meaning itself, contained in that wood, plastic and paper - even if it is illusory.

Take this in contrast to the world of television and the video game. In front of a digital screen the rest of the body evaporates, leaving a pair of floating eyes and ears, with a disembodied hand clutching at a joypad or a remote control. If the human being is a complete entity, experiencing reality through all of its senses, with this mind-thing on top of it, then the degradation of the natural body cannot be a good way to become 'sensate' - a total bodily intelligence. This is the latest form of sociality plaguing my generation (sorry about that everyone, not that your  generation was any better though - our problems are just different to yours). The faces are turned away from other human beings, hyponotised by that alluring cobra we call the screen. Millions of pounds are funnelled into each project, to feed this snake so wretched, and the more there is at stake, the less risk they will take, creating an overall taste in the video gaming world of microwaved baked beans which have been left in the fridge for too long (and have gone a disturbing shade of grey). In terms of getting the logical part of our brains ticking, there is little to be found in the digital world. That is not to say it does not exist, for there are always gems which deserve to be sought out, yet fundamentally social logic belongs more to the humble board.

Which brings us nicely along to the next point. Namely, that sociality and logic may seem like opposites; the difference between the stuffy mathematician and some form of inane socialite, but they are fused together perfectly in chess. This is the most obvious example of social logic, where the extent of seriousness and challenge is determined only by how russian ones opponent is!

If we shift out focus back onto the outside world, we can see some parallels with our chess boards, for our own world is itself a game, with its artificial laws of varying utility. To dredge up an old cliche, life is one massive (board) game, or at least it might as well be. The outcome of this game is not determined by the number of actual pieces available, anymore than putting a thousand chessmen in a pile will change anything, or mean anything. The game is determined by rules which organise how the physical pieces are arranged, and it is this arrangement which makes the game; its laws, its objectives, and all of the informal rules which accompany it (see custom). Eventually, the rules and logic of the game become nature itself, tied in to the otherwise meaningless components that make it up. Naturally, it is a game skewed in the favour of the rules-writer in real life, who will appeal to the 'always true' realms of logic and/or nature to justify themselves, but we won't go into a crypto-anarchist rant just here. The good boardgame at least is different in that the designer has to balance their creation, ideally in a way where everyone has a chance to win, sometimes individually and sometimes cooperatively, with no particular favour incurred on any party (see the bourgeois management class and their political cronies!). Perhaps then the board game is a true representation of logic, which incorporates a fairness and reciprocity (that is, a mutual exchange of one thing for another) within it, for the mutual benefit of all parties involved. You cannot, after all, truly win anything if you cheat. The useless and selfish designers of life's board game could learn a thing or two from chess to say the least.

One cannot be alone with a boardgame. Just as ideas come to fruitition when they are brought out into reality and discussed, so too do we come to life as social animals in a mutual environment. The board game staves off boredom like a ward. Imagination is what truly enriches life, drawing from a well of infinity, filling us up like protein-rich bread. It can also fuse all of this with the challenge of logic and puzzle, which other forms of interaction do provide in all fairness, yet in lesser quality and quantity.

Selim 'Selim' Talat

The Philosophy Takeaway 'Logic' Issue 45

Logic - By Martin Prior

Logic

Well, for the first time a Norfolk pine has adorned the front page of this Newsletter, and I am sure it is fitting that such a tree be considered the Tree of Logic.  From any picture of one, one can see the branches pleasantly grouped, towards the top isolated branches, then a few in pairs, then threesomes and then in larger clusters the lower one gets.  And so it is with logic, we add to our concepts, and likewise we must add to our axioms (self evident truths which require no proof).

We do know of course that two frownies make a smiley, as displayed at the top-most point of the Tree of Logic, and of course that it is entirely wishful thinking that two frowns make a smile, but of course two negatives do make an affirmative, when they are ‘composed’.

Now if we try and do an overview of logic, we can either survey how it has developed, or survey its applications.  But if you survey its applications, you will view each at its most recent, most technical stage of advance, and you will be looking at matters of similar complexity.  Such applications include mathematics, computing, language, the logic of possibility and the logic of time.

If we look at the development of logical theory, Western philosophy sees its beginnings in Classical Greece, and this includes logic, as one of the Classical trivium, which also included grammar and rhetoric.  In these Classical times, such pursuits were far from trivial, and rhetoric in particular was essential for the new Athenian ‘democracy’: slavery gave the masters time to be democratic, and logic was a key weapon.  Types of fallacy could be collected as an informal analysis, such as argumentum ad hominem, sustaining an argument by attacking the personality of the opponents.  But then formalisms appeared, for example in Aristotle’s Prior Analytics the use of symbols for logical variables was used for the first time. 

Aristotle further introduced laws such as his Three Basic Laws of Thought, which importantly included the Law of the Excluded Middle.  All propositions have to be either true or false.  And one of Aristotle’s most detailed systems is that of syllogisms. Maybe we should look a little bit more closely at what syllogisms are about. There are basically three key models, ‘Barbara’ ‘Dimatis/Disamis’ and ‘Daraptis’:

(I, Barbara)

(i) All X is Y,

(ii) All Y is Z,

(iii) Therefore all X is Z.

Note that if we say that no capitalist has a heart, we mean that all capitalists are heartless - or more strictly ‘non-having a heart’. Note also the formulaic convention of using ‘is’ when it will often be replaced by ‘are’.  Let us capture Barbara by means of my ‘Bridge of Transitivity’:

Barbara

Now modern logicians will say that X need not exist, and if so, Y need not exist, and if the latter, Z need not exist either, so now we can look at our second format, where we change (i):

(II, Dimatis/Disamis)

(i) Some X is Y (Dimatis), or some Y is X (Disamis)

(ii) All Y is Z,

(iii) Therefore some X is Z.

Our third basic form is Daraptis, where we have to assume that ‘all X are Y’ means that X exist, and I give the example from my previous article:

(III, Daraptis)

(i) All socialism (Y) is theft (X),

(ii) All socialism (Y) is against human nature (Z),

(iii) Therefore some theft (X) is against human nature (Z).

Daraptis

Now with Laws of Thought, and syllogisms, we have powerful tools in argumentation, be it logic or rhetoric, but when we look at Dimatis and Disamis, they are listed as having the same result, captured in mediaeval mnemonics by having the same vowel pattern, but this doesn’t say why some X are Y means that some Y are X in logical rather than contextual terms.

Developments appear to have lapsed, in the Christian world at least, till around 1100, with the work of Pierre Abélard, born in Brittany in 1079.  According to the Stanford Encyclopaedia,

“He is, arguably, the greatest logician of the Middle Ages and is equally famous as the first great nominalist philosopher. He championed the use of reason in matters of faith (he was the first to use ‘theology’ in its modern sense), and his systematic treatment of religious doctrines are as remarkable for their philosophical penetration and subtlety as they are for their audacity.”

Despite Aristotle’s Law of the Excluded Middle, it was Abélard who introduced the doctrine of Limbo, which was accepted by Pope Innocent III.  He was later a great icon of the Enlightenment and brought back knowledge of the Classical philosophers to the mediaeval world.

But anything can be examined, and maybe there is an excluded middle, making a similar deduction to Abélard when he deduced there must be a Limbo.  Modern logicians say that while the Law of the Excluded Middle is taken as axiomatic, we must be on the safe side, and look to see what coherent systems will look like if we relax this assumption.  Those working in Quantum Theory wish to, saying that moving particles can be neither large nor small in their size, despite the logical requirement that a particle must be either small or not small.

So we must perhaps chop off the top of the Tree of Logic:

But I for one am not sure I’m happy to saw off the branch I am sitting on...  because someone tells me it is to be on the safe side... :][

Martin Prior

The Philosophy Takeaway 'Logic' Issue 45