In defence of Utilitarianism - By Lloyd Duddridge

In defence of Utilitarianism

Perfect the Will, the Mind, Feeling, their corporeal organs and their material tools; be useful to yourselves, to your own ones, and to others; and Happiness, insofar as it exists on this earth, will come of itself.
- Bolesław Prus


The greatest happiness for the greatest number. On a instinctual level this appears to make sense. However Utilitarianism has faced many challenges from the philosophical community. They say that it undermines the idea of individual justice. That the idea would seemingly condemn an innocent individual if it suited the whims of the mob. That also seems instinctively correct, justice is not a numbers game, its not a mathematical equation. They also say that one persons conception of happiness, is not the same as another's,so how could happiness be seen in such general terms? They also say that it is bloody hard to spell. This final objection I concede to the prosecution. However it is the previous two objections that I wish to defend Utilitarianism against.
The first objection is usually formed by using an example such as this: Imagine a single man that holds views that are not dangerous,but make the mob angry. Now under simple Utilitarian argument the mob are entitled to do what they want with the man who makes them unhappy. The reason they are able to do this is their collective happiness,seemingly outweighs the happiness of the individual. Thus things such as gang rape,would be permissible. So how could Utilitarianism respond to such a damning objection?
I would argue that it could say this in response. Justice is a bedrock upon which most peoples happiness lies. Now the mob may seem the larger group in the example outlined. However the even greater number is the group that believe in justice. Thus in committing an unjust action, you are committing an action, that in the longer term would bring about greater unhappiness. The question of justice can be thrown back at the critics of utilitarianism. Does justice bring about the greatest happiness in the greatest number? The answer is seemingly yes. Thus it appears that even concepts go through the process of utilitarian judgement. We disregard injustice for the simple reason that it fails the utilitarian test. This is the simple answer to those who say that utilitarianism will always lead to unjust situations. The evidence is that all concepts we hold in either positive or negative go through a process of utilitarian testing. So if justice is utilitarian,how can utilitarianism be unjust?
The second objection is that utilitarianism is too general. One persons happiness is not another's. This is a point that I concede, but it is one that I feel can be overcome. This is because I feel that we must approach ethics and morality in a different way. We must see morals as useful myths. They may not hold in all possible universes,they may not be god given. However they are still vital to human life. They are myths given to us,in order to give us rules for action. They are bed time stories but no less important for that. Now if we see ethics as an individual call for action, what could be a better lessons for action than, you should act in a way you think will bring about the greatest happiness for the greatest number?
How can you understand other peoples happiness they will ask. I would answer that we should not view action as something that happens blind,and arbitrarily. We act after experiment, after seeing what works for people. We can do things such as ask others what makes them happy. Action does not happen in a vacuum. Or rather it should not happen in a vacuum. This is the difference between intelligent action, and unintelligent action. So how can we understand other peoples happiness? A good start may be by asking them what makes them happy. Communication and language make utilitarianism possible. Thankfully these are two tools that human beings possess.
So in summary. Happiness is increased by concepts such as justice. Thus utilitarianism rather than being the ethical school of the unjust, becomes the province where justice is taken most seriously. We do not value justice because it is our duty to value justice, we value justice because it makes us happy. Thus gang rape is not permitted under utilitarian logic, for it undermines justice and thus undermines happiness. Additionally we must see ethics as rules of action. Man made rules, rules that can be questioned, but vital rules none the less. Now can there be a rule that can be improved upon than this: When you act, act to increase the greatest happiness for the greatest number? I would argue there is not. However all ethical rules will only work if we do not make ourselves into islands. We must communicate with each other. We must ask other questions on just what they value,for we value that which makes us happy. It on this remark that I rest my defence for utilitarianism.

By Lloyd Duddridge

What is Meta Ethics?

How many times have you heard someone say that such and such is a ‘wrong’ thing to do? How many times have you wondered what it was for something to be ‘wrong? It’s likely that you’ve done more listening than you have thinking. But consider the question for a minute. What do we mean when we say that an action is ‘wrong’ or ‘good’? 

Questions like these come under meta ethics. The word ‘meta’ comes from a Greek word which means ‘above’ or ‘beyond’ and essentially meta ethics asks what we mean by moral language. It analyses the reasoning behind the nature of moral language. This is extremely important; we use moral language every day but if this is just a reflection of our emotions then how seriously should we take it?

There are several different views on the meaning of moral language and this article will give you a crash course in some of the key basic ideas. The first is that moral language can be verified (proven to be correct) by looking at the world. The second view is that moral language is like a gut instinct (or intuition to be more precise). The third view is emotivism – moral language is simply a reflection of emotion. Finally, there will be a brief comment on the view that ethical statements gives guidance on how to act.

Got me thinking!

So, the first view is that moral language can be verified: Aquinas (a medieval philosopher) believed that moral language is exactly like non-moral statements. For instance, when we say that Michael Jackson died in 2010 we can check this and know that it is true. When it comes to moral language, if we say that murder is wrong, we can check this against nature to see whether it is true. We know that murder is wrong because it prevents happiness. It prevents the natural fulfilment of the individual. Aquinas would say that such a statement is non-negotiable – murder is always wrong.

However, G.E. Moore argued that the stance Aquinas was advocating (ethical naturalism) was incorrect. He believed that we could still question whether murder was wrong – it is not like asking ‘does happiness make people happy?’. There is a clear answer to this question. However when terms like ‘good’ and ‘right’ are used we can always ask – is it really though? This is known as the ‘open question argument’ because there is no clear answer to whether it is genuinely good.

Maybe terms like ‘good’ etc are indefinable? This was the opinion of G.E. Moore who refuted (a posh word for ‘argued against’) Aquinas. Moore believed that trying to define ‘bad’ was like trying to define yellow. In his classic example he stated that “We know what ‘yellow’ is and can recognise it whenever it is seen, but we cannot define yellow. In the same way, we know what good is but we can’t define it.” How do we know what good is? Through our intuition or gut instinct. This is our second opinion in meta ethics that is called intuitionism.

Like Aquinas, G.E. Moore also has his refutation. According to Moore if everyone knew morality through intuition, then surely our intuition would be the same. We would all be able to get along like one big happy family. However, this is not the case and seeing as Moore ruled out defining moral terms there can be no empirical evidence to prove either side.

H. A. Prichard answered this criticism. He defended G. E. Moore by arguing that it was down to education and that individuals were at different stages of moral development. But this takes us back to the open question argument. How do we know who is further up the stage of moral development? Furthermore, many people who have been educated academically hold different political views. They do not vote the same way. They do not believe the same beliefs. If intuitionism was true, humans would have worked out what was good and what was bad by now. However, clearly we haven’t as the questions of meta ethics are still floating around.

Nevertheless, it is vital to ask these questions. It would be irresponsible not to look into what we mean in our moral language. We need to work out whether it is subject to social conditioning; whether it is reliable; can it be used as a guide to a moral life? Intuitionism is often backed up through the example of love. When two people fall in love, those on the outside ask how they knew they loved each other and the two people in love reply that they ‘just knew’. It was intuition. On the basis of this intuition they were prepared to make life changing decisions because of it – to get married, to have children, to get Sky Plus. Is this however, what we should rely on when it comes to decisions on whether we should euthanise a family member? Many people love bad people who abuse them mentally and physically. Love is blind. Does this mean that intuition blinds us and encourages us to merely ‘make do’? It is clear that it is important to ask what we mean by ‘right’ and ‘wrong’.

Once intuitionism and ethical naturalism have been ruled out this leaves us with emotivism and prescriptivism. Emotivism is the belief that when we say something is wrong it is a reflection of our emotion – it has also been called the ‘Boo-horrah theory’. This is because when the pacifist says ‘War is wrong’ what they are really saying according to A J Ayer is ‘Boo to war’. When a politician says ‘War is good’ what they are really saying is ‘Horray to war’. In this sense, ‘good’, ‘right, ‘bad’ and ‘wrong’ are all “ethical symbols.” There is no logic involved in ethical language; it simply expresses whether you approve of an action.

Ayer also believed that we chose our words carefully to provoke a similar feeling of agreement in the listener. When we say ‘you act wrong when you steal money’, what we are really saying according to Ayer is that you the listener should not steal because it goes against how I feel. Our moral language therefore is not only a reflection of our emotion but it is also heard in terms of command.  Ayer has summed this up in the following; “Ethical terms do not serve only to express feelings. They are calculated to arouse feeling, and so to stimulate action.” 

Compared to Aquinas and Moore this is a much more balanced perspective in that it looks for justification of what we say. It calls for less reliance on emotion - or at least to be aware of its presence. However, seeing moral language as pure emotion may not leave it enough substance for any ethical statement to be taken seriously.

However, emotivism also has its own downfalls. Perhaps G.J. Warnock gives the most serious criticism. He argued that ethical statements aren’t judged on emotional response and that they are actively discussed. Ethical statements are not the linguistic equivalent of arithmetic sums; ethical language is much richer and far more muddy than science. This criticism can also be combined with the reductionist challenge to Ayer’s theory concerning meta-ethics. When something is reductionist, it is an oversimplification. Applied to Ayer’s theory, it suggests that when someone states: ‘the Holocaust was inherently evil’ it has the same value or meaning as when a child says ‘I like the red jelly babies best’. Moral statements seem to go further than emotion, in everyday language moral language has the most weight, and therefore emotivism has some apparent downfalls. We do not base important moral decisions on emotion alone; in cases such as abortion, we consider our own empirical circumstances and our beliefs (although there is room for debate over how these two elements relate to forming our emotion). 

This leads us on to the final view on meta ethics that is prescriptivism. RM Hare tried to explain moral language through commands. He felt that moral statements were more than mere expressions of emotion as they tell us how to we ought to act. Ergo, when an individual states that ‘Murder is wrong’ it isn’t personal revulsion as such but it is a method of stating the command that everyone should not murder a fellow human being. Hare developed this into his Universability principle. This effectively states that they wish that their moral statements were true for everyone in every circumstance. Importantly, Hare can be seen to have more substance than Ayer as a deontological approach can be taken. A deontological approach holds that a moral agent (i.e. the individual) has certain actions that he/she is required to do and so morality involves action. Hare also believed that a way of judging goodness was whether it fulfils its purpose (or actuality in Aristotelian terms). Thus, Hare does seem to give a more solid basis than Ayer in terms of practicality for being able to have discussions and moral judgements.

All that is left to say is congratulations. After reading this article you will (hopefully!) be more aware of the moral language that we use and what we mean by when we say ‘wrong’. We have covered over 500 years of thought on this subject in a few minutes, which is pretty impressive.  The criticisms I have listed here, as well as the strengths, are only a select sample so by no means has everything been covered in depth. So please, please, please discover more; it is definitely worth the time and effort. Beauty is in the detail.

Timothy Blythen