Philosophy debunked: making the sensible, sensible (in 500 words or less) - Perry Smith

Philosophy debunked: making the sensible, sensible (in 500 words or less)

This is the part of the newsletter where we take a particular philosopher/philosophical theory/term and debunk it, to take it, and make it (hopefully) in some way more understandable, less wordy, but also interesting (and maybe give you something to show off to the boss/significant other with). For me, and us (at the Philosophy Takeaway), this is what philosophy is/should be, anyway (when it's not just written for: a) stuffy, dust-covered academics, to show how big their brains are - by their being able to understand and use such terms, and b) to give a reason why they're single, and most probably will die alone - by their having to spend so much time learning what these terms mean, and having none left over for a social life, which is something, again, we, at the Philosophy Takeaway, too, only know too well.

Now, without further ado, Rationalism (in 500 words or less). Rationalism is the philosophical school whereby we can simply come to the knowledge of things by the use of our logic alone. Using deductive reasoning - that is to use our intellect, we can see the truth of propositions, such as those of mathematics (like 1+1=2), but also, in some cases, of the truth of things outside this analytic (of things being true in themselves) framework, and is also extended to such things like the existence of God (this being opposed to Empiricism, whereby knowledge/truth is derived by induction- that is, acquiring knowledge from experience and the sensations we derive from the world). Because of this intellectual capability, Rationalists also believe that there are such things as innate principles (of there being things that we can know before experience), due to this inbuilt capability of our being able to find truth, without having to experience it. Another prominent feature of Rationalism, therefore, is the mind/body distinction; Rationalists, in the most part, are also Dualists, which means they see the mind and body as being two separate, distinct, things (and also view the mind as being more important), as it is through the mind that we come to know things about the world. Some examples of Rationalists include Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz; a good text to help understand Rationalism further would be Descartes’ “Meditations on First Philosophy”. And there you have it, Rationalism in 500 words or less!

 

And now for some Takeaway Teasers

 

I) Descartes takes his date for the night, a young Spinoza, to a posh restaurant, after the two of them had a falling out over Descartes’ mind/body Dualism, to make it up to him. Them both being Rationalists, they thought it best to go out, as logically, this would preclude there being any washing up afterwards, and would also allow for more time for the playing around with candle wax for the both of them. The waiter seats and hands them the wine list, with Spinoza then asking to order the most expensive bottle on the list, citing the fact that, due to their both being expressions of the same one substance, God, it would be as though, in a roundabout way, he (Spinoza) would be paying as well. To this, with a knowing glare, Descartes chortles: "I think not!", and *POOF* he disappears, leaving Spinoza the bill.

II) A man walks in to a café. This is not any ordinary café, however, but is one that is solely made up of either benevolent spirits or deceiving demons (though the two are not physically distinguishable from one another, say, by appearance). Spirits, by nature, then, always tell the truth; however, demons, again, by their nature, always lie. Suffice to say, this, and the café’s supernatural inhabitants, were not something this man was aware of before he chose this particular café to have lunch in. Upon entering, the man is confronted by two individuals, and for the purposes of this, they shall be named individual ‘A’ and individual ‘B’, as the man was not given either of their names. Individual A, upon this meeting, immediately tells the man that individual B is a demon; B says, in response, that neither A, nor themselves, are demons. So, who is the spirit? And who is the demon?

Perry Smith

The Philosophy Takeaway Issue 46 'Open Topic'

Identity - By Perry Smith

Identity

Identity; identity is something you're born with. You are born to be your father's son. You are born to be such and such a social class. You are born to be privy to certain experiences and not others; in essence, you are born to live a certain life. Identity is not who you are, but what others have made you; this is why we qualify ourselves in terms of our relationships to others: on our family, on our friends, and also on what we do for a living (of how we spend our time, no matter how trivial this is).

We are also a product of our material circumstances. Freedom, for me, has always, as a definition, been at odds with itself (the same of which, I feel, can be said of autonomy). This is what I would ultimately argue. You are everything that others remember about you. Even momentary lapses in your past, others will use to construct the identity of you. There would be no personal continuity in this sense, otherwise. How you feel one day is entirely different, and non-comparable to how you felt the previous day; hence is the transient nature of experience.

Though, I am not denying, here, the continuance of certain feelings brought on by physiological considerations,but would say, that are experiencing of them can be differentiated - on an immeasurable, moment-by-moment, basis. You may say that you hold, generally, certain moral principles. And yet, seemingly, when you fall from these, this is what people will remember; never mind the intention you held before, during and after. Also, the very fact you can be deterred from being such and such a way, proves that it was not, necessarily, an integral part of what you are. Thus, a distinction must be held, personally, between identity as objective, of how others see you, and identity as subjective, of what you believe yourself to be - though this, I would argue, is 'fluid', always in flux, rather than 'fixed' (which is what others try to make of us, due to some, seemingly, indescribable quirk of human nature - if there is such a group as humans, there must be something common to all of them, to group them as such), regardless of rational, outward deductions, by others, based upon previous inductive 'evidence' to the contrary. And this is instrumental in maintaining individual wellbeing, also, though I acceot others' judgements can also be positive. Identity, itself, I believe, already presumes the existence of others. And in the true deciding of the self, how is this tenable? In conclusion (and this may seem somewhat anti-climactic), we are what we are; and what this is, may not, necessarily, be known by the individual. All I am certain of, however, is that the need for organisation and understanding seem to be prerequisites of whatever condition we seem to suffer from, and focus much of our attention on, for some unbeknownst reason. Here, as in most things, I find myself wanting to cite the idea of human constructs, and the true ineffability one finds themselves under when trying to rationalise any such things.

By Perry Smith

 
The Philosophy Takeaway 'Identity' Issue 37

Something/Nothing - By Perry Smith

Something/Nothing

 Something is Nothing (we shall leave it capitalised, as it is the name of an experiential state -albeit the absence of one- but is still distinguishable) if it is nominally so, if there is no ‘thing in itself’, nor is a relation among things; and we must distinguish this from a space in between objects, which have metaphysical corporeality and ideological extension. Rather, Nothingness is merely an abstract concept; it is something that is born from the understanding (we will not argue here on general linguistics, of whether all names of things are simply nominal, but of their having a direct correspondence to the object/objects –if we can disseminate or separate the ‘thing/s’ of experience from the general ‘block’ of perception/ consciousness) and is different in kind to Something, that is, to experience (it is not different in degree, but rather different in kind, as it is unexperienceable, and is conceptually existent as opposite, i.e., the negation of Something) (Fig. 1.). Therefore, Something is what we determine as being the object/s of our experience, and Nothing is simply the negation of this; it is merely a nominal abstract concept used to negate, and to understand this absence (although it is not existent, except conceptually, as I have already suggested). ‘All that is, is experienceable; and all that is not, is not. Rather, it is a polarised (albeit entirely separate) abstraction to general experience’ would be a good concision on what we have said.

Fig.1.

------------------------(Dividing line)------------------------

Something                                                        Nothing

So, why is the distinction between Something / Nothing even existent? I believe that this dichotomy of experience/ non-experience (and is not a dichotomy in the sense that they are not entirely separate, or are, but only in the terms of Nothing being the opposite of Something, but of not occupying any meaning, or qualities, except as lying in whatever the opposite of what something is- therefore being wholly dependent on it) exists as a self-reflective act on our parts on the nature of experience, and is used to understand the object/s therein / the nature of experience; it is simply a by-product of experiencing, of being able to formulate concepts -based on what we experience- and is merely an abstract negation of this. It is also a rationalisation of non-experience, or the cessation of experience, and may also be a comprehension of what death, or non-being (as a conscious entity), may be like. So, as a concept, it may be existent, partly, because of our own understanding of the finitude (notions of time, etc.) of experience, and may therefore be an entirely human concept, which further adds to the idea that Nothingness is nothing in itself, but rather, as being nominal, and based wholly on our understanding of Something, as a negation of it.

By Perry Smith

The Philosophy Takeaway 'Something/Nothing' Issue 24

A brief exposition on the nature of art

Inadequate, but not inane; that is the best way to describe art. It describes, or tries to recreate, an instance of phenomenological being, or witnessing; to describe an experiencing. Even Surrealism is the recreation of an initial evocation of a feeling or an emotion. Art is merely a striving to produce, in an objective existence, what one feels in the sub...jective. Thus, art is the trying to posit something lasting, from something essentially transitory; it is an objectively perceivable memory. It is the artist's, albeit crudely, objectifying of his most inner being; "I am here; I am alive, and I am experiencing". It is understandable then, the frustration most of us feel when the image envisaged in our minds does not correspond to that created upon canvass; it does not provide an adequate copy of this rememberance or feeling, and even more so, for us who are unskilled at such things. If anything, art is demonstrative of an artist's narcissism to be remembered, to have one's meaning validated by a sense of futurity and permanence, when otherwise, there would be none. Thus, it is harrowing for the artist, to try and recreate an instance of being over a period of time; it ends as a conglomeration of instances, of merely a trying to remember that one, initial, instigating one. Thus it becomes distorted and unrecognisable from the original, though this, I'd hasten to add, is too remembered in mind, and not felt. Thus, we create a copy, of a copy, of a copy. Therefore, one cannot pre-ordain the form and content of art, it simply is. One may have an idea of what one wishes to paint on canvass, or strike into marble, but the finished piece is truly original; it sprouts only into existence once the tired artist's hands are finished. It is only definable afterwards, the same as in life. We, and art, are merely consecutive instances, but that is going more into the nature of our own phenomenology, than into the nature of art itself.

Perry Smith