Liberalism: from Philosophers to Society? - By Martin Prior

Liberalism: from Philosophers to Society?

In my last article, Liberalism: from Philosophers to Politicians, I discussed a dozen or so writers on freedom/liberalism, from Lao-Tze (6th century BC) to Isaiah Berlin.  Strands of economic and socialism crept in, with Adam Smith seen as the father of economic liberalism, and John Stuart Mill the father of social liberalism.  To my mind there is not so much a dichotomy as a triplet, with civic liberalism often, as with the LibDems, ambiguous between the other two.

In fact, social liberalism is not merely non-economic liberalism: it must identify the social freedoms that economic liberalism violates.  In this paper I shall examine philosophers from the 'alleged' social liberal John Stuart Mill, to the 'alleged' libertarian socialist Noam Chomsky.  I shall then briefly discuss how liberalism and conservatism differ when adopted by the ruling classes: basically conservatives appear more progressive when empire or sphere of influence is expanding, and liberals appear more progressive when this is contracting.

As I said in my last paper, John Stuart Mill’s (England, 1806-1873) liberalism coincided with the shift from Whigs to Liberals round 1868, and most of the period of Gladstone’s first of four Liberal Governments.  He is said to be an early champion of this new Liberalism.  But he was very much a utilitarian, and believed in the pursuit of happiness as the ‘highest normative principle’ rather than a right.  Thus he was a utilitarian as well as being considered the founder of ‘Social Liberalism’ and accepted state intervention if there were sufficient utilitarian grounds.  We thus see a marriage of utilitarianism and a concept of social liberalism.

Thorstein Veblen (US, 1857–1926) was born roughly at the start of Mills’ last 15 years.  He was influential to those in America who saw liberalism as seeking a rational basis for the economy above competition and seeking of monopoly power.  His central argument was that individuals required non-economic time to become educated individuals.  This development of liberalism to transcend the economic was parallelled by Isaiah Berlin (Latvia/United Kingdom, 1909–1997), famous for distinguishing two concepts of liberty 'positive' and 'negative' liberty which he saw as mutually opposing concepts.  Positive liberty arouse through state power to ‘liberate’ humankind from its worst aspects and was in danger of sliding into totalitarianism.  On the other hand, negative liberty required that individuals were given maximal freedom from external constraints, as long as the like rights of others were not violated.

These last two are important in the development of the social factors in liberalism, but just as Adam Smith had added formalism to economic liberalism, so did the UK Liberal John Maynard Keynes for Keynesian economics, which was critical for developing new attitudes in attacking the Great Depression.  Those who attacking present-day austerity cite Keynes, and show how Obama’s policies are working, just as Roosevelt’s did.

Countering Keynes are Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman, who developed neo-liberalism, which has crept into much modern economic thinking.  It had disastrous results in Chile, which was set up as a flagship under the then military junta, which eventually abandoned much of  the thinking of Friedman’s ‘Chicago Boys’, Chileans who had studied under Friedman in Chicago.

The prolific works of Noam Chomsky (USA, 1928- , linguist and philosopher) give a day-to-day and blow-by-blow account of neo-colonialism.

Now I have shown how ‘liberalism’ can mask conflicting attitudes of the social and economic liberals.  But the term social liberalism has been adopted by many in the centre and centre-right, such as John Major.  In fact we note from wikipedia that:

“Social liberalism seeks to balance individual freedom and social justice.  Like classical liberalism, it endorses a market economy[my italics] and the expansion of civil and political rights and liberties, but differs in that it believes the legitimate role of the government includes addressing economic and social issues such as poverty, health care and education.”

To my mind, endorsing a market economy is neither social liberal nor indeed utilitarian; John Stuart Mill had nothing significant to say about the market.  But in fact not only is the market an imperfect tool for social objectives.  It is not even an optimal tool in terms of economic efficiency.  Thus:

(i)            The optimum sum of profits is not the same as the sum of optimum profits across companies: this is particularly noticeable in the drive to oligopoly and monopoly.

(ii)          The optimum sum of profits is not the same as the sum of optimum profits across regions: in my view, though it is yet to become an important strand of economic thinking, wealth tends to gravitate towards an economic centre of gravity, something which increasingly afflicts the EU.  And of course quite notoriously the North-South Divide is notoriously inefficient for its inequalities.

(iii)         The optimum sum of profits is not the same as the sum of optimum profits across time: this is most notable in the tendency of enterprises to exploit resources to extinction.  The air, water, animals (for example fish) and in many ways, not least humans.

If I had a wider economic brief here I would discuss ways of addressing these problems.  But in the writings of Raymond Plant (UK, 1945-), political philosopher and Labour Peer writes extensively about neo-liberalism.  According to John Gray’s review (in the New Statesman) of Plant’s Neoliberal State, “Plant's central charge against neoliberalism is that, when stated clearly, it falls apart and is finally indistinguishable from a mild form of social democracy.”  I can say no more.

When we move from philosophies to politics, we move into an area where I believe we must look into the political adherents’ motivations in terms of their part in patterns of exploitation.  And in the developed countries, this really means thieves squabbling over the booty from exploitation of the Third World.  This issue is in no way addressed by social marketers and mainstream social democrats.

So regardless of the self-image of liberals and conservatives, I shall briefly express their behaviour in practice among leading world powers. The liberals value and develop their skills, and are quite ready to create empires and ‘neo-colonies’, which take advantage of their targets’ ignorance and often fear.  The Tories’ approach, with whom conservatism is an asset, is frighten would-be supporters into loyalty, playing on ignorance and fear.  This rather than technology is their power base, but despite its shaky nature, they will resort to force against their opponents rather than persuasion.

Martin Prior


The Philosophy Takeaway Issue 51 'Open Topic'

Art - By Eliza Veretilo


This weeks artist was Eliza Veretilo: http://neonsuitcase.blogspot.co.uk/

The Philosophy Takeaway Issue 50 'Open Topic'

Why We Need Philosophy Kings - By Lloyd Duddridge

Why We Need Philosophy Kings 

Is the study of philosophy useful in our modern society? In a time of centre-politics and flimsy coalitions, it could be argued that it has never been more relevant than it is now. Plato thought that, in much the same way the empirical world was open to change, so was majority opinion, and posited an alternative system; that of the ‘philosophy kings’,  raising the question, should philosophers be allowed the chance to rule, instead of the politicians?

In the west, many just take it for granted that democracy is the system that best guards the well-being of the people. Plato, however, saw quite the opposite; that democracy leaves them open to manipulation and flattery. As an elected representative the politician must listen to the people’s opinions but job is to make you feel emotionally linked to the ideas that he is arguing for. Plato stated that the politician does not care for truth but simply swaying the opinion of the general public towards his agenda. 

In his book The Republic, where he outlines his blueprint for an ideal society, Plato states that he philosopher would not be democratically selected for if he was, then he too may be swayed by the whims of the people. The people would have no vote but would have to place their trust in the system that Plato’s Philosopher Kings would do what is best for the populace. So why should we trust the philosopher over the politician? 

The philosopher is the opposite of the politician. Just as he would aim to understand the realm of ideas that make up reality, the philosopher would also seek to understand the underlying laws of politics, those that go beyond mere opinion. The philosopher would not aim to win, for he would never have to put himself forward for popular election. The philosopher would care only for truth, and would look for the underlying laws that would improve the populace’s lives in the long run. 

Where the politician is a being of emotion, the philosopher is a being of reason. Plato stated that reason is independent of emotion, and used the analogy of the soul as a chariot. The talented driver would be able to keep the wild horse of emotion in check and, for Plato, the driver who would control his soul the best would be the philosopher; he who is closest to the forms of reason. 

It is the rational philosopher, not the flattering politician, who would best be able to keep their emotions in check. They would not commit to rash decisions, but make choices that were in line with reason, even if they differ from public opinion. 

Plato believed that the Philosophy King would need to be selected by other philosophers. Free of the restrictions of election by popular vote, a continuous chain would emerge. Philosopher Kings could then rule entirely of principles of reason, aspiring towards perfection. 

Plato thought that this system would bring about a greater sense of justice than any democratic system ever could. But can reason ever be pure and free from emotion? Can, and should, philosophers rule? 

Lloyd Duddridge

The Philosophy Takeaway Issue 50 'Open Topic'

Liberalism: from Philosophy to Politics - By Martin Prior

Liberalism: from Philosophy to Politics

In researching this article I decided to look for liberal philosophers, and in Wikipedia some 80 are listed, but I have picked out some dozen to illustrate the development of ‘liberalism’ a word that first appeared in the 1810s.

Let us first look at the Chinese thinker Lao-Tze (6th century BC), founder of Taoist philosophy.  In general, he did not think people deserved or needed freedom: he thought it counter-productive to do otherwise.  Thus his economic views were not by implication laissez-faire, since his maxim ‘wei wu wei’, do without doing implied an objective.

Aristotle is noted for his work Hê politikê, in which happiness is his main objective.  He believed that oligarchy was a ‘good thing’ but too profit-motivated, and democracy was a ‘bad thing’, serving only the poor, and that meritocracy was the best thing only not feasible.  Therefore the best solution was a compromise, the ‘polity’ combining democracy and oligarchy.  Some economic points: (i) note the parallel between oligarchy and modern-day oligopoly, and (ii) Aristotle was a firm believer in private property, thinking it more effective than property-less examples among the ‘barbarians’.


Niccolò Machiavelli (Florence, 1469–1527), the ‘realist’ political philosopher, has been seen by later generations as a cold schemer, who worked in the environment of the many Italian states, principalities and republics, which latter he preferred, despite the name of his most famous work, Il Principe, The Prince.  In general, he argued that that liberty was a central good that government should protect.  In this he conflicted with those who believe freedom requires small government.
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Thomas Hobbes (England, 1588–1679) has been identified by Leo Strauss as the ‘father of liberalism’, but his principle theme was that government was motivated by ‘interest’, an important term which transcends politic and economic.  But he believed that only strong government could restrain unchecked interest.

Before turning to Locke, we should look at Baruch Spinoza (Netherlands, 1632–1677),  a Jew with complete commitment to determinism, for whom freedom could only be the freedom to say ‘yes’.  We must note this issue, since other philosophers discussed here have not notably addressed it.  

John Locke (England, 1632–1704) believed in “man’s” ‘natural rights’, which he considered to be life, liberty and ‘estate’ (property) as well as tolerance.  In economic terms , his theory or property was based on actions rather than inheritance.

John Locke died in 1704, some 70 years before Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations (1776).  But we must take Smith together with Anders Chydenius (Finland (then a part of the Swedish realm), 1729–1803) a Finnish priest representing the clergy in Sweden’s four-estate parliament, whose main output was in 1766, ten years earlier.  He advocated complete economic and individual freedom, which included workers’ rights of mobility, choosing their employer, freedom of speech and trade. And abolition of wage and price controls.  He helped draft Sweden’s 1766 Constitutional Law on the Freedom of Printing, which is the forerunner of many natons’ freedom of information laws.  Along with Adam Smith he had a concept similar to the ‘invisible hand’.

Adam Smith (Great Britain, 1723–1790) was indeed the founder of economic liberalism, though we see its seed with a number of thinkers before him.  His economic liberalism included the abolition of slavery, but he outlined the idea that finite resources will be put to ultimately their most efficient use if people were allowed to get on with it and act in their self-interest.  Smith does of course have his critics and disciples, notably Mrs Thatcher with her apparent tenet that greed is good.


We can take together Jeremy Bentham (United Kingdom, 1748–1832) and John Stuart Mill (United Kingdom, 1806–1873).  Bentham is known as an early utilitarian, and his individual freedoms were far-ranging and well ahead of his time.  They included equality for women, abolition of slavery and separation of church and state.  His economic liberties included free prices, free trade and no restrictions on interest, and the end of colonialism.  But he was an interventionist regarding control of monopolies, pensions and health insurance.

Mills’ liberalism coincided with the shift from Whigs to Liberals round 1868, and most of the period of Gladstone’s first of four Liberal Governments.  He is said to be an early champion of the latter.  He believed in the pursuit of happiness as the ‘highest normative principle’ rather than a right.  In this regard he was a utilitarian and has been considered the founder of ‘Social Liberalism’: he accepted state intervention if there were sufficient utilitarian grounds.  We thus see a marriage of utilitarianism and a concept of social liberalism.

Thorstein Veblen (1857–1926) was born roughly at the start of Mills’ last 15 years.  He was influential to those in America who saw liberalism as seeking a rational basis for the economy above competition and seeking of monopoly power.  His central argument was that individuals required non-economic time to become educated individuals.

Veblan died in 1926, when Friedrich Hayek (Austria/United Kingdom/United States/Germany, 1899–1992) was starting to develop the philosophies of neo-liberalism, in which the market supplant any concept of social justice.  Neo-liberalism states that the states role is to ploice the free working of the market.  He did in fact predict the Greta Depression, but strongly opposed the views of John Maynard Keynes (Britain, 1883–1946).  Apparently the two became friends as air-raid wardens during WWII.  It was of course the conflicting views of Hayek and Keynes that revealed the conflict between economic and social liberalism.

I could say more about Milton Friedman (United States, 1912–2006, economist) and Noam Chomsky (United States, 1928– , linguist), but I shall conclude with the ideas of Isaiah Berlin (Latvia/United Kingdom, 1909–1997).  He is famous for distinguishing two concepts of liberty 'positive' and 'negative' liberty which he saw as mutually opposing concepts.  Positive liberty arouse through state power to ‘liberate’ humankind from its worst aspects and was in danger of sliding into totalitarianism.  On the other hand, negative liberty required that individuals were given maximal freedom from external constraints, as long as the like rights of others were not violated.

I stress this dichotomy because in my own arguments I have used a similar but different dichotomy: freedom from and freedom to.  Strangely freedom-to corresponds almost exactly to negative liberty, without the emphasis on the external.  To my mind this is the essence of Social Liberalism: the freedom to do as one wishes provided that other people’s like freedom is not violated.  To my mind this is part of single-person ethics if one wishes to consider ethics in axiomatic terms.  Freedom-from is generally emphasised by neo-liberals, for who freedom-to is less important.  Freedom-from is in fact in conflict with positive liberty.

If we take the step from philosophers, to my mind, the Whigs and Liberal successors differed from Conservatives in the way they managed imperialism.  Unlike Bentham they were in favour of colonialism.  But liberals knew when to advance and when to retreat.  But conservatives do not really know how to advance, but cling on to what they have  got, even when wisdom counsels retreat.  To my mind part of their motivation lies in the libs having a stronger capital base.

The European liberals are on the advance, mainly in partnership with the Christian Democrats, while British Tories are resisting retreat. So I believe are the Americans, with all their machinations in Latin America, the Middle East and elsewhere.

LibDems are a different animal altogether: they are civic liberals, ambiguous between the economic and the social. People usually talk of a dichotomy between economic and social liberalism, but much of what is called social liberalism is really civic.


I have finished by turning from philosophers to politicians. Many philosophers are also politicians. like Thomas Jefferson and the Finn Chydenius. Many too were close to politicians, like Machiavelli, Keynes and Friedmann.

In this paper, social liberalism is something that is rearing its head: John Stuart Mill and Chomsky are names which might be associated with social liberalism, but this requires a closer examination at some later stage.


Martin Prior

The Philosophy Takeaway Issue 50 'Open Topic'

'Philosophical' and 'Philosophy' - By Selim 'Selim' Talat

'Philosophical' and 'Philosophy'

I often find myself wondering if the 'Talk to a Philosopher' sign at the stall is truthful. It certainly works, and is a great way to communicate things on a direct level. But how much philosophy are we actually doing? It is seems so open and easy - is philosophy really just questions out of a hat?

Posing the question

It is safe to say that there are various levels of philosophy. This does not mean that the more complex is any better or worse, but only that it requires more vigour to understand. Some philosophy is so rigid and heavy that it would require a spare three months and the aid of a Dr.Bowles to come to grips with! This is why I want to make the distinction between 'philosophical' and 'philosophy'.

A good example of the philosophical can be found in any of the Nasreddin Hodja anecdotes. He is a wise man, and a notorious prankster, who is famous in a number of lands, but most closely associated with turkish folk-lore. Let us have a look at one of these anecdotes:

One day, Great Tamerlane went to the Aksehir Central bath, where Hodja was waiting. After getting undressed and wrapping pestamals (large bath towels) around themselves, they entered the hot room. They sat on 'gobek tasi' (large very hot marble). There, Tamerlane asked the Hodja:

  'Hodja, you are a very learned one! You know to appraise value properly. Tell me, what is my worth?'
  'Ten Akce' replied the Hodja
Tamerlane flew into a rage, fuelled by such a low appraisal of himself.
  'You idiot!' said Tamerlane, 'how can you say my value is ten Akce. This bath towel   alone is worth ten Akce!'
  'I included that when I gave you my estimate!'

Funny it is. To ruin this brilliant jest by explaining it, Nasreddin is saying that Tamerlane is worthless. And it is quite philosophical. But philosophy? The beginnings of philosophy yes, but I would say that we are not doing Philosophy (capital P!) through the above anecdote. It is profound, but it is not part of a larger systematic profundity! Our Nasreddin Hodja is a wisened prankster, underminer of authority, a secular voice for sanity and practical master of common sense, but he doesn't have a single system which he espouses - at least, not one that I am aware of. This does not make such a folk-hero any less enriching to the soul, but I would not put him in the same category as, say, Immanuel Kant. Nasreddin is far too readable!

To provide a counter point, I will provide a random quote from Parmenides great poem 'On Nature'. Beware – it is a dense one!

One path only is left for us to speak of: that it is. On this path there are a multitude of indications that what-is, being ungenerated, is also imperishable, whole, of a single kind, immovable and complete. Nor was it once, nor will it be, since it is, now, all together, one and continuous. For what coming-to-be of it will you seek? How and from where did it grow?

Parmenides is saying here that we can only speak of what exists. He is saying that what exists cannot have been generated out of nothing (because we cannot speak of something which does not exist) and is therefore uncreated, undestroyable, unmoving and complete. Change is therefore impossible. This is part of Parmenides metaphysics (which is a fantastic word for theory of reality). If you were to ask me what school of thought this was, we could go to the Stanford Encyclopedia of philosophy. There we might find a raging debate: Is Parmenides true to the 'Strict-Monist interpretation', a 'Logical-Dialectical Interpretation' or even a 'Meta-Principle Interpretation'! I do not know, as most of these words are beyond my meagre understanding. Yet on a surface level, it is demonstrating how philosophers categorize thought, and how an understanding of the history of philosophy is essential to participating in these discussions and understanding someone like Parmenides.

This shows that philosophy is not one thing, but a huge variety of well-argued (and sometimes lived) ideas. Great dialogues have raged throughout years, the decades, the centuries, even the millennia. To continue them, we must first understand what came before us. To look forward, we follow the trail of history to its horizon (which for Western philosophy lies in the direction of ancient greece).

To ignore this challenge for more easily accessible philosophy is to blind ourselves. This is why academic philosophy is so important - it will ensure that there is always someone out there who understands the immortal classics. I cannot stress enough the importance of the classics, the power beholden in those ancient words. They are more powerful than any religious revelation, or any particular political ideology, or any transient consumer enterprise. You can rest assured that the most 'successful' in even today's society are familiar with their Plato. Anti-intellectual rantings against academic philosophy are pursued by people who have neither the courage nor the consistency to deal with it.

Answering the question

So, what are the differences between philosophical and philosophy? I would say that something philosophical is often a question, or a wise saying relating to practical life. A small piece of a massive puzzle, placed down on the jigsaw board of reality every now and again.

Full-on Philosophy does raise questions, but I would say that it also attempts to answer them afterwards. For what is the point of a question if there is no answer? I call utterly false the prejudice against philosophy which sees it as a purely questioning discipline. Many a philosopher has ended philosophy (at least in their own minds!) with an epic piece of work. And other great philosophers produced complete systems of thought, Spinoza and his Ethics coming instantly to mind. These were massive jigsaws, with all of the pieces in the box (you just have to work out how to do them).

Philosophy does provide us with the best-reasoned answers, even if we can never truly know that they are absolutely right. It also provides us with complete answers; just look at any of the four great schools of ancient greece for a working example. These answers often lead to more questions, or challenges against them, and never truly seem to solve it all. This is surely better than a hodge-podge of ideas on random t-shirts or holding onto a belief because it feels comfortable to. Furthermore, philosophy can provide a guide on how to live. It just requires a lot more understanding and effort than a one-off quote. Philosophical systems might use maxims to promote themselves and be easier to comprehend, but these are not replacements for the harder work of comprehension.
'Philosophy' is largely systematic and truly deep, not just in the questions it tries to answer, but also in the literal length and time taken to understand it. 'Philosophical' thinking is profound, but out of the context of a complete system. Both are useful, however, I would not say they are the same thing. This article for instance is 'philosophical' but not a work of 'philosophy'.

What we must truly be careful of are intellectual tricks disguised as philosophy, catchy little sentences or attempts to be clever. To finish on a cynical note, this is a quick paraphrased line from some horrible advert I once saw on the brain-melt-box: 'What if we replaced 'OK', with 'What if?'

Utterly sickening.



Selim 'Selim' Talat


The Philosophy Takeaway Issue 50 'Open Topic'

Art - By Eliza Veretilo





This weeks artist was Eliza Veretilo: www.neonsuitcase.blogspot.com

The Philosophy Takeaway Issue 49 'Open Topic'

Utopia : a useless dream or the construction of a future? - By Alice S. Dransfield

Utopia : a useless dream or the construction of a future?

The word "utopia" was first used by Thomas More to describe an imaginary island that had an ideal social and political system. He formed the word "utopia" from the greek word "topos" (place) and the negative "ou", so we could translate the word "utopia" into: a non-place, or a place that doesn't exist.

Since then, the word "utopia" has been used to describe fictitious political and social models imagined by various thinkers. It has also taken a connotation, an utopia is somehow like a dream, nice but unreal...

Has utopia a place in today's society ?

The major criticism made towards all the different utopias imagined throughout the centuries is that they don't take into account reality, "nice ideal, but totally disconnected from the real world" many would say. Or that these social and political systems are so different from the ones we live in that it would be impossible to change society so much in one go.

So if these utopias can't be realised, what is the point in writing them down? No more than any other novel, a nice thing to read and to dream about.

But is that really the only contribution utopias can bring to today's society? For even though it is true that it is very difficult to install radical changes into a social and political system, does that mean it is useless to try?

History has proven to us that social and political systems are not static, and that radical changes can occur (not necessarily for good). And here is, I think where utopias take an important dimension because they are, in my opinion, an obstacle to conservatism. They can become the physical support to new and revolutionary ideas, those ideas that have trouble being expressed via other medias. Presented as dreams, they show to humans that human nature isn't static, that changes, even drastic ones, can at least be produced mentally. And what humans conceive can eventually be achieved.

So utopias, far from being merely useless fictions, participated in the construction of possible futures by offering to our minds new perspectives, free from the bounds of our conservative societies. Opening our minds is not an utopic idea!

Alice S. Dransfield 

The Philosophy Takeaway Issue 49 'Open Topic'

The Gooseythro: What is knowledge? - By Selim 'Selim' Talat

The Gooseythro: What is knowledge?

Badger wanders the market place (agora) alone, asking his philosophical questions to all those who pass by.

“Where are you headed on this bright day, dear Stoat?”

“Badger! I shall not talk with you, else you try to suck me into one of your long winded dialogues. Good day.”

“And to you, too. Ah, but who is this flapping down from his favourite oak tree. Owl, over here! Owl, come and land by me.”

“Badger! I am in such a rush I cannot even stay to preen my feathers. And even if I were not so hurried I would be suspicious that you will try to-”

“Oh never mind, away with you (some animals are so busy these days). Yet who is this cresting yonder hill -- a bard? Gooseythro, lo there Goose, where are you headed?”

“Badger! I was just going to play my lute by the beach. Should be a few hours of sun left yet. Will you join me?”

“I would, but I am engaged with something else. Perhaps you could help me?”

“But of course my friend, you need only ask.”

“Very well, Goose. You see, I was most perplexed this morning, having woken with something of an aching head. I fear some manner of disease has stolen from me memories I once safely stored up there. I can't, for all of my efforts, seem to remember what 'knowledge' is!”

“That is a most unlikely story Badger. It is almost as if you were trying to ask me a philosophical question about knowledge in a roundabout way. Nuh...hold your tongue, you don't need to apologise to me. I will just answer the question and then continue my gay quest to the beach. Knowledge is things that you know. There, you are cured and we can continue enjoying our lives.”

“Knowledge is what you know. Hhhm. But what about --”

“Now look here, Badger! I know this game. It's the one where you keep on asking questions indefinitely. I shall not indulge you any longer!”

“Good Goose, this is my last question, I promise. All I want to know is what knowing is.”

“Okay, fine! Knowing is when you have an understanding of something as being true. I know that I am carrying a lute. I know that I am in Athens in 458 BC. I know that I am going to the beach very, very soon and that you are coming with me to enjoy your life.”

“Yet these are all obvious enough truths and thus easy to grasp. If this were all knowledge is, everyone would be an expert of everything just through brute existence alone. Is knowledge merely our understanding of the obvious?”
 
“Yes, well I don't just know obvious things like the date. I know that two and two combined together make four, I know how to play elegant strains on my lute and I know that the gods alter the passage of stars and moon”

“Now let us not get carried away here Goose. How is it you know it is the gods who move the stars about?”

“Simple really. What else could it be?”

“Why, it could be any number of things!”

“But I have evidence on my side, Badger. Very powerful evidence.”

“Will you not share this with me before you depart?”

“Yes I will (for I must admit this is getting interesting). Every time the priesthood has struck upon the golden drum to wake the gods a new moon has followed. How can it be denied that the moon-change is created with the awakening of the gods?”

“The answer is quite simply to not strike the drum, and wait to see whether or not the moon emerges.”

“But then the moon shall not emerge and the tides shall wither!”

“How do you know this, Goose? I would love to know.”

“For the new moon turns only with the beating of the drum. It has been proven time and time again.”

“Perhaps it is not the drum that wakes the gods, but some other force we do not yet know about. Although let us not get bogged down here. I for one find it interesting that you tried to present evidence of your knowledge, as opposed to just stating a belief.”

“A foolish Goose I would be if I did that! I am certain a belief is not knowledge, no. It is just a belief. Once we have evidence for it, then it becomes knowledge.”

“So this means that only things we can confirm as true count for knowledge? So your memory of the song about the Pussycat and the Minotaur is knowledge, because you know how to play it, but the actual lyrics are not knowledge, as most of us  do not believe in ridiculous mythical creatures such as pussycats.”

“No, no, no. You misunderstand. The lyrics are knowledge of a story, but the story itself is false. Remember, that because the adventures are supposed to be illogical, it is alright to call them knowledge. But if I said three and two made seventeen, this would not be okay.”

“So what you are saying, Goose, is this: You know the song to be representative of a false, fantastical world of magic, but it still counts as knowledge, because songs are supposed to be fantastical.”

“Precisely, Badger – you put it more succinctly than I ever could.”

“I must disagree with you, dear Goose. You see, I would categorize your song as a work of art,' at this, Goose blushed, 'which is designed to operate on a different level to our everyday ideas of knowledge. For instance, I may know how to fix a sandal, but this is merely technical knowledge. I may know the meaning of life is to overcome the world of appearances in the search of perfect ideas, this is debatable philosophical knowledge. I may know that it is unlikely the gods concern themselves with piddling little moons, this is knowledge of what is not the case. And I may know how to sing a song about unlikely creatures such as possums, this is not really knowledge, but more an artistic expression.”

“Then that would mean that not everything I know is knowledge! Oh this is confusing me greatly, Badger. Although I do appreciate you dividing things up into categories, I would much rather think that everything in our heads that can be proven should be considered knowledge.”

“Oh, we move in circles like a donkey around the well! Tell me, dear Goose, if you were lost in the desert and you saw a mirage of an oasis, would that constitute knowledge?”

“Why not at all, Badger. I would think that I was being tricked. Just as when I dream about making love, I know the visions to be something different from real life. But even those illusions are still part of my being, part of my memory, and part of my knowledge. Oh I insist it!”

“Then, just as an illusion has no realness outside of your head; is it not fair to also call your song an illusion? Alluding to a reality that is not there, after all?”

“I suppose I shall have to give you that point, Badger. Are we finished now?”

“Not quite yet, I have one last question. Is the song a good song?”

“Why of course it is! Do you doubt my song-craft, Badger?”

“I do not. Yet Mule is not fond of your strains. Nor is Eel”

“What does Mule know about music?! And Eel hasn't ears – she has no right to judge.”

“Ah, so people have varying 'knowledge' about what is good music and what is bad. Mule dislikes your music because he does not know it is good.”

“Precisely! That poor deprived quadruped.”

“And why does he not know your music is good? Certainly he has heard it on many occasions. This means either one of two things: either everyone can eventually be taught to learn about what is good or not, or some things are not knowledge and are just down to the whims of the individual animal.”

“No, that is nonsense. My music is good because most people have said it is. This is my evidence – this justifies my belief and makes it true. Right, Badger?”

“I am not convinced, good Goosey, I’m not convinced at all. You are saying that knowledge is determined by the greatest number of animals assenting to it. Yet this means that if everyone said the sky was a dark shade of maroon, we would have to submit to it, in spite of our contrary evidence.”

“Now it is you who is being naughty, Badger! Earlier we established many different 'knowledges'. One was based on what we could see, 'the sky is blue' and then we all conclude that the sky is blue. Art however, must depend on some other type of knowledge – for all of us experience art, but not all of us come to the same conclusions. So in terms of the worth of song, I would say that it depends on the numbers who like it.”

“Well confound me, Goose – ye aesthetic avian! I did not come here to discuss matters of art and other trivia. I must say I am disappointed, with you and with myself for falling into such a trite dialogue.”

“Do not for a second blame me for all of this. You are the one who started it all.”

“I did, but not with the intention of falling into the nettles of trickery.”

“How have I tricked you?! If anything it is you who is the notorious, slippery irritant.”
“You said that mule did not have knowledge of your music being good, because he was lacking something. Then you said that what made your music good was that most people enjoyed it. However, everyone knows that mule is obsessed with gossip and tends to conform to what others say. The likelihood of mule not knowing that other people liked your music is not worth considering.”

“Oh. I had not considered that much.”

“Such a conclusion is ludicrous; that the way to know if something is 'good' is to know whether or not everyone likes it. There must be something else that determines such knowledge. Hhhmm. Aha, I have it. We are looking at the external reaction too much – we must look at the actual songs themselves to determine if they are good, removed from the tastes or whims of any audience, including our own tastes.”

“Very well, Badger, lead on. For I am ignorant of what else to say.”

“There must be elements of the bards song that determine its 'goodness'. Likewise with anything, be it a spear, a ship, a 'skin of wine, a canal. The knowledge of whether or not any of these things we create are 'good' is contained within the very thing itself – how well it achieves its purpose, and whatever people outside of it say is just so much noise!”

“Let us stick to the song example if we could. What makes a song good?”

“Well it is evident that you are the better bard between us, owing to my being tone-deaf (and these oversized badger paws). I would venture to say that you have more practice upon the lute and are familiar with it. Your spirit is more finely attuned to the sensitivities of sound and you are capable of weaving emotional tapestries with chords and melodies. You listen to many other examples of good barding and this allows you to discover and fulfil the purpose of music. All of these things combined make up knowledge of goodness.”

“But what if a song fulfils all of these criteria and yet a certain stubborn mule still refuses to acknowledge that the song is a master-work of craft, function and delivery? (If I may say so myself!)”

“Then there is evidently something amiss with the mule.”

“So it is then a case that mule does not know good from bad, and must be told what is good in order to appreciate it! That is no more ludicrous then suggesting one must know what is popular in order to know what is good.”

“Well...well...I never said this would be an easy process did I? Nor did I ever lay claim to any particular knowledge, most rampant goose!”

“Hold your bluff, Badger. You aren't burrowing out of this one quite so soon. You stopped me asking for answers, I tried to give you one and ended up being led along a dark, misty river with yourself at the helm. Now you have struck a rock and rather than admit it you try and blame me for this outcome. How perfidious!”

“I maintain it is no contradiction and you are at your perverse little word games once more. Look, you said that by knowing what is popular we can know what is good. I said that by knowing what makes up good we can find out what is good. My suggestion is that we use philosophical inquiry to determine this, you were just referring to the bulk herd.”

“But so are you, my astute companion. For consider this: You are still maintaining that the good of my song is still outside of my song, in the reactions people display toward it. It is surely inescapable that your 'knowledge' is influenced by what is considered popular or no, by what we call the classics, and so on.”

“No! Now you paint my tail red and accuse me of leaving a bloody trail across the fields of philosophy. The fact that people enjoy the classics is not where knowledge of the classics being classic comes from. The classics are classics for being classic, in and of themselves. Dig?”

“But you still know what is or is not classic because of-”

“Again with the red paint! Regardless of how much people exalt and enjoy the classics, the knowledge of their being good could be discovered independently. This is why bards are so afraid of declaring something a classic – for fear of being wrong. We know when something is good because it will fulfil goodness against any odds.”

“You soar with the clouds with your transcendent knowledge. An irony, as I am a mere land-goose in comparison, earthy and even headed.”

“Where else could we discover knowledge of 'good'? In the mass flow, in the fickle utterance of sparrow, or the shallow chatter of magpie? There is more to life than mere appearances and bulk numbers.”

“Tell me Badger, now that the sun has gone down and I have missed the bright beach, at least leave me with an answer. Was it contagious?”

“Contagious? Whatever do you mean?”

“The thought-disease that stole your knowledge of knowledge?”

“Ah that! Yes, evidently it was so.”

“Still, something of a contradiction isn't it?”

“Not at all. I know that I lack knowledge, for I know that there is something out there, some place where perfection resides. We all know this, surely. Although, not myself, not all the time, I have doubts too.”

“I am going home, Badger. I am going home and I want to be left alone for a very long time.”

'Very well, whimsical beast! Flutter off with you.”

“Yes, farewell my fluffy friend.”

“Ah, that was most exhilarating. But who is this, cluttering along the passway. Horse! What are you doing out so late dear Horse?”

“Badger! I'm in a rush to the stables, but even if I weren't...”

Thus concludes the dialogue.


Selim 'Selim' Talat

The Philosophy Takeaway Issue 49 'Open Topic'

Fuzzy Logic and the Multicultural Society - Martin Prior

Fuzzy Logic and the Multicultural Society

Take Giles FitzPatrick (randomly chosen name).  Is he posh?  Yes or no?  And Violet Smith (also  randomly chosen name).  Is she?  Yes or no?  Well, actually, having met both of them, yes AND no.

Well, various logicians have invented three-valued logics, and a non-logician like myself has invented five (so there!)  But those who believe in fuzzy logic believe in an infinite number of truth-values, ranging in a continuum between 0 and 1.  Although there have been perfectly respectable exercises using fuzzy logic in the form of computer algorithms logicians like the renowned Jan Łukasiewicz (1878-1956) worked on this idea as far back as the ’twenties.

As an example of such an algorithm given in Wikipedia for FL:

For example, a simple temperature regulator that uses a fan might look like this:

IF temperature IS very cold THEN stop fan
IF temperature IS cold THEN turn down fan
IF temperature IS normal THEN maintain level
IF temperature IS hot THEN speed up fan

There is no "ELSE" – all of the rules are evaluated, because the temperature might be "cold" and "normal" at the same time to different degrees.

In fact, in order to make a decision, one has to reduce each test to a yes/no test.

To my mind, truth corresponds to the facts, and fuzzy truth corresponds to perception of the facts.

Well, what about the multicultural society?  Do we have it?  Is it a good thing?  Er, yes and no.

When David Cameron tries to say the Multi-cultural Society is not working he may be saying more than he thinks.  There is indeed a Multi-cultural Society already, which has been here for a long time: the class system.  Is he making it work?  Yes or no?  Now if DC is 85% posh, this is captured in fuzzy set theory: he is 85% part of the ‘posh fuzzy set’ – and indeed 15% part of the non-posh fuzzy set!  And what we find from London up the east coast, the class divide is sharper than elsewhere in England.  And elsewhere in the English-speaking world, divisions are much more blurred. 

So in this respect we do not want a multi-cultural society, but rather a vari-cultural society, rather like those vari-focals.

To my mind this also applies to variations based on ethnic divisions.  Let us not fan doubts on the Multi-cultural Society, and let a vari-cultural society – with continua rather than sharp boundaries - happen without the heat.

And of course those of us who 51% earn our living be 51% proud of being working-class.


Martin Prior


The Philosophy Takeaway Issue 49 'Open Topic'

Art - By Eliza Veretilo



This weeks artist was Eliza Veretilo: http://neonsuitcase.blogspot.co.uk/

The Philosophy Takeaway Issue 48 'Freedom'

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