Ethics: nature or nurture?

Some 40 years ago, when the youngest councillor on my council, I was furious that my comrades chose to ban Last Tango in Paris, and I sat down with the Ten Commandments in from of me and despite ignoring much of them, came out with four principles. They were:

i) maximise human potential subject to the limitations of both present and future environments, (person+environment: ‘Green’)

ii) when two or more people are involved in an activity, provide relevant knowledge, (group: Rights, often civil)

iii) share equally the burdens imposed by the limitations of the natural environment, (group+environment: here Socialism)

iv) be free to do as one wishes, as long as others are not affected. (person: here ‘Social Liberalism’)

The last seemed to me to be crucial, and the other principles stated the relations with both other humans and the environment required to achieve this. Banning Last Tango in Paris was clearly a violation of (iv).

Now I have shown how ethical principles might be built up from key concepts, here individuals, groups and the present and future environment, though I have the most difficulty with (ii). But how far are such principles in-built to nature? My view is that (i) and (iv) are in-built, at least for the present environment, and when that person is oneself. A principle about person+environment is a key feature of bringing up the young and indeed caring for the old, who still have a role to play. It is Rule (iv) is all about wishes and will, and it is custom that ensures that people learn how their actions affect other people.

In other respects we have what might be considered ‘original sin’, including violation of the future environment, withholding crucial knowledge and greed. Custom leads communities acting more ethically towards each other to a greater or lesser extent, for the survival of the community, but that does not imply they will respect the rights of other communities. In effect the group mentioned above is not wider than the community.

And not everyone would agree with my principles. An economic liberal might say:

i) socialism is theft,

ii) socialism goes completely against human nature, and

iii) theft is every bit part of human nature.

Martin Prior

Philosophy Takeaway Newsletter 36 – Human Nature

Human Nature Is Good

                     

 

You may wonder, how looking at the world today, dare I say that human nature is good? Well, because of two reasons, the first is that I believe so, the second reason is why I believe so.

Humans are very malleable creatures, we respond to our environment, to stimulation and to manipulation. We live mainly in a state of ignorance, the majority of us have no access to education and the education we do get is mediocre. Thus our true nature as such, is rarely actualised; it’s rarely seen as what it could be. The reason why, to me, things appears so bad and dominated by the ‘evil side’ of us is because of fear. Fear is the tool that enabled 'primitive' man to survive, to be aware of dangers, but it has also stopped the modern man from fully flourishing. 

Fear has become conditioning and we have not yet learnt to drop it. Underneath it all, the human spirit is good, it’s undeniable that we strive for goodness as a whole. That’s why things like universal peace are so appealing, because we are creatures that thrive in peace. We have created war out of fear, but that doesn’t make us bad. Even the politicians who declare these mentioned wars go and give themselves a Nobel PEACE prize. Why? Because they have to show a good side, even characters who are moved primarily by greed have to put on sheep costumes in order to appeal to others. Because we are fragile and compassionate by nature. We care. Our bodies are fragile and we are sensitive. WE are not predators. We are biologically quite weak but our strength lays in that we are primarily emotional and intelligent.

             
Thomas Hobbes said man is the wolf of man, and how right he was, but he forgot to add, man is the friend of man, woman is the mother of man, humans are the lovers of humans. Who causes you pain? People. Who relieves you from that pain? People.

Take the example of a child, pure and innocent, old enough to talk yet young enough to not have been schooled to hate. In a child you see a tendency to play, to interact, to discover and create. He gets taught evil. You can say people are born with a personality, yes, but people considered evil, have a history of having evil done to them. Evil is not intrinsic, because it’s not life affirming and we are a surviving species.

            
 I propose you an experiment; say one generation of children of the world are given good living conditions, food without poison, a well rounded education which doesn’t consist of memorizing things like our current education consists of. These children are taken on trips to see natural wonders, they are taught to respect animals, and they’ve had a stable home with present parents. I say one, only one generation that has these conditions in the whole world and you will see human nature; the goodness of human nature. We are evil because we are scared, because we suffer so badly. 

We need to evolve in other aspects than technological, we need to care for each other, and that to my view, is the next step. We live in a world which sits half way between ignorance and primitive living and the modern world, we are a stone throws away from enjoying watching public executions and a stone throws away from visiting other planets. We sit half way between the past and the future, here in the present. We are not at the top of our capacity; we haven’t experienced the full capacity of human nature. But I can see, I can feel, a capacity for love, for understanding, for growth toward a world of philosophers and free thinkers. Human nature is ever changing and ever evolving, evolving to perfection and what is that? Goodness. 

That’s why I believe human nature is good.

Eliza Veretilo

 

The Philosophy Takeaway 'Human Nature' Issue 36

Jetlag - By Martin Prior

Jetlag

My mind says Pacific Standard Time (GMT-8). My brain says be on the safe side, go to sleep and wake up every two hours.

I know that I have a mind: it is that which knows and thinks.  I do not need to know I have a brain.  Many societies don't.

And when I see somebody with brains, s/he may quite reasonably be in two minds (or more).  But the number of minds and the number of brains need not be identical.  To my mind that is the key point.

And to my brain, it is time to go to sleep again. 

By Martin Prior

The Philosophy Takeaway 'Mind & Body' Issue 35

The false dichotomy of the mind and brain: - By Samuel Mack-Poole

The false dichotomy of the mind and brain:

Romeo: Peace, Peace, Mercutio, peace!   

Thou talk’st of nothing.

Mercutio: True, I talk of dreams,

Which are the children of an idle brain,

Begot of nothing but vain fantasy.

Lines 95 – 99, Act 1, Scene 4, Romeo and Juliet.

Many of us who are philosophically minded have met ardent dogmatists. Although they are entertaining, due to the spittle dripping from their chins, their insight into the human condition is limited by its very nature. As philosophers, it is our role to think a little deeper than most, to aim that beautiful light of truth into the murky depths of ignorance and be prudent about the claims we can make. In all honesty, I see a true philosopher as someone who considers and analyses, deduces and induces, reverses and inverts, asks questions and argues, not from ego, but due to that ache that resides in us to discover and uncover. Thus, my brethren, I can only reiterate that we should be prudent about claiming what we can know.

Firstly, we should start with defining our terms – Ellese Elliott, my intellectual sparring partner, assures me that this methodology is the most respected academic method. Who would I be, as humble as I am, to flaunt what the academics hold in such a sacred regard?  I will use a common dictionary to define the key terms. The mind is defined as:

“(in a human or other conscious being) the element, part, substance, or process that reasons, thinks, feels, wills, perceives, judges, etc.: the processes of the human mind.”

I believe this definition, is, however, too narrow to define the word “mind”.  After all, there is that unoriginal Hollywood homage to mental illness in the shape of the film A Beautiful Mind. What is being referred to in this film title is the protagonist’s intellectual capacity; thus, the word “mind” is clearly utilised in different contexts. Do you think it is any coincidence that we use the word “mind” as a noun and a verb? If you live in London, you know to “mind the gap” – this is because of the word’s etymology, which I will expound upon later.

Thus, when juxtaposing the prior definitions with the definition of “brain”, we will come to the sticking place.  The word brain is defined as:

“Anatomy, Zoology . the part of the central nervous system enclosed in the cranium of humans and other vertebrates, consisting of a soft, convoluted mass of grey and white matter and serving to control and coordinate the mental and physical actions.”

However, when we dig a little deeper, we find another definition – the word “brain” is a direct synonym of mind! Here’s the definition: “the brain as the centre of thought, understanding, etc.; mind; intellect.”

The mind can only ever be part of the brain, after all the word’s etymology is from the Old English gemynd, meaning memory. And what is memory, if not part of the brain? The “mind” is a mere word, outdated in its use, a construct, a mere fiction with a fantastical history. There is no credible proof that it exists: none, whatsoever. Any atheist, who attests there is a mind, is contradicting their arguments on a lack of a deity.  No true empiricist (a philosopher who believes that knowledge is mainly gained through experience) will ever make such a lowly assertion that the mind exists outside or independent of the body.

Philosophy, a noble tool of thought, critical to critical thinking skills, is in danger of becoming regarded by scientists as a dead subject. When notable and intelligent philosophers contradict what can be proven to be true, we sully the name of philosophy. When we jump down the rabbit hole of the supernatural, we may as well gift our scientific critics goldfish in a barrel to shoot at.

Science and philosophy shouldn’t be antagonists but natural bedfellows: Dawkins and Singer epitomise this. The fact that science was born from philosophy, and now has returned to its mother with the gift of knowledge, is beautiful. We should celebrate the fact the prodigal son has returned, with such noble presents to boot.

We know now, due to advancements in the field of biology that a thought is a physical process. A neuron (also known as a neurone or nerve cell) is an excitable cell in the nervous system that processes and transmits information by electrochemical signalling – that is what a thought is. Now, my friends, should we disregard this information?  No! We should embrace it. This definition, although narrow, doesn’t capture the poetic beauty of imagination, but it does convey that a thought is a distinct physical process; one which is observable.

There is, of course, much more to thought than the biology of it. Nevertheless, such an earthy materialistic, purely biological view of the mind isn’t cold; it doesn’t lack romance. In fact, I would say that that those who look forward with truth in their hearts are the most genuine in their outlook regarding humanity, as well as its place in the vast cosmos in which we reside. This is far more preferable than looking back to the 17^th century with rose tinted intellectual glasses.

I know what I’m saying is controversial, even abhorrent to some philosophers. Please understand me, as I must clarify my position. I’m not saying ancient philosophy has no value; that would be foolish. However, where ancient philosophy contradicts modern science, should we really stand idly by and argue the inarguable? Although it is a good mental exercise to do so and it is important to have such debates, can we really invoke the fallacy exposed by Russell’s teapot* in good conscience?

I started with a quote, thus I shall end with a quote from the great Christopher Hitchens, which illustrates the facile pomposity of ignoring empiricism, albeit ironically:

“My own view is that this planet is used as a penal colony, lunatic asylum and dumping ground by a superior civilization, to get rid of the undesirable and unfit. I can't prove it, but you can't disprove it either.”

By Samuel Mack-Poole

* If Bertrand Russell claimed that a teapot was orbiting Jupiter, and we had no scientific way of proving that there was no such teapot, it would be ludicrous to believe that it existed! What he is saying is that the burden of proof in philosophy lies with the person making the claims, and not on the other person to disprove it - Ed.

The Philosophy Takeaway 'Mind & Body' Issue 35

The origins of mind and body (and other possibilities) - By Selim 'Selim' Talat

The origins of mind and body (and other possibilities)

I -

The origin of an idea is hard to know, if not impossible. Who was the first to suggest that the mind and the body are made of two different substances? It might seem obvious to us now that there is a rational part of the human being, which has the ability to think things through and make choices, and that there is the bodily part which is full of primitive drives and urges. For this is the philosophy  whose roots stretch back to Rene Descartes, who is essential in the understanding of this question, but also saturates it, and whom I shall avoid discussing. What is important is that if we remember that this mind and body divide was not always so, it was not always 'obvious' to us.

  If we go back to the ancient greeks (a familiar path we take in western philosophy, unschooled as we are in the wisdom of the east!) we can find a different idea of body and soul in the great works of the playwright Homer. Although we was a dramatist, his work was so  epic that he literally created the greek pantheon of gods! People  genuinely lived their lives by these passionate deities, believing that they could influence human beings directly, and so deserved worship. This was a mythical world view that encourages what we would call determinism - that our actions are decided for us by a force beyond our human willing. It was only after the body died that the soul took any real form, enjoying the rest of its time in the underworld.

  Even the idea of mind being associated with the brain is not so obvious, for it was a popular ancient greek idea that the main core of consciousness was actually in the human heart.

With Pythagoras comes a strengthening of the souls place in this equation. A believer in eternal rebirth (who would stand up for a bullied dog if he thought it contained the reincarnated essence of a late friend) Pythagoras gives us the idea of the soul being linked to this world, not departing elsewhere after death. It is an eternal element within us that is separate from the actual physical body and can remember its past lives. This makes the body separate to the soul in quite a profound way, like a passenger switching between trains.

  In addition to this we have the mathematical world view of the Pythagoreans. Perhaps this was the start of reason as we know it! For now all could be reduced to mathematics and this meant that everything could be understood through the power of pure mindthinking. Suddenly, the prospect of perfect reason separate from 'earthy things' becomes a possibility.

II -

The pre-socratics (the philosophers who came before Socrates) were often searching for the one fundamental substance of the cosmos. They were often asking 'wot stuff wos made of!'. Thales had his water, Anaximenes had air, Heraclitus had fire and all had their reasons for believing this. Today we might see physicists trying to find the building blocks of everything, atoms and quarks and strings and energy and such. The point to be raised here is thus: If everything is made of one specific substance, then your computer is made of the same thing as you. So is the light hitting your eyes, the chair you are seated upon, and so on. There is nothing differentiating you from any of it. Which raises the further question - what is so special about us and how do we know that inanimate objects do not also possess conscience?     

  If we consider ourselves star-stuff which somehow gained awareness, then we must at some point have transformed into life out of this 'inorganic' matter. Yet not all life contains 'mind' (or at least, we do not all think it does), so at some point we must have moved from life-without-sentience (awareness) to life-with-sentience. If I may boldly speculate, I believe this to be the result of a gradual emergence out of wilder nature through the creation of language and concepts to distinguish things. Then a sense of time which allowed reflection on the past and thinking about probabilities in the future, as well as developing an understanding of death as inevitable. The belief in spirits and perhaps even deities would be the first acts of creativity which are not so directly related to survival. The development of counting and planning would be essential to this idea of continuous identity. Slowly but surely, the world around could be divided up into more and more parts, with an understanding of how those parts interact to make up the whole. The greater this process of division and articulation, the greater the understanding of oneself an as a separate and articulated entity, yet the greater one understands the outside, the greater one can perceive the whole and understand how it continues to affect us.

III -

  

A new question is raised: If we are made of the same thing as everything else, is it possible for us to transcend our environment by making choices? Materialists can look at the world as a machine, a series of causes and effects that could all be discovered if we had greater knowledge of how the machine worked (we could in theory discover what caused what, from every perceiveable angle, and then predict the unfolding of the entire future!). Mind in this case would be awareness, and 'free will' an illusion. Yet this search for cause and effect does not have to be limited to scientific study of matter. If everything is made out of chi, then perhaps this too can be understood as an unfolding process of cause and effect.

  The point is this: Our minds must be outside of the chain of cause and effect to have freedom.

IV -

Now that we have had our brief look at this question lets get pragmatic. Why bother talking about it at all?

Why but for the reason that the mind / body distinction is of immense importance to our lives. It is not just 'empty philosophizing'.

  The culling of animals every year is encouraged by the separation of mind and body (animals do not have minds from this perspective and thus have no basis for the right to life). 

  When someone commits what we deem a crime they are tried as an individual capable of making choices, with the severity of their punishment being decided by how much they were under duress. We assume that people are always capable of rationalizing their actions.

  Intelligence is something separate from the body, it is not part of a unified process, for the body is just that place where all of our 'yucky stuff' is contained – it is low and base and disgusting where all of those horrible things such as taking a s*** happens, and where all of those immoral impulses such as sexual pleasure threaten the ones 'purity'.

  It is of massive importance to the politics of freedom, to aspiration and competitiveness, egotism and individuality. In short, it is of importance to every aspect of our lives!

By Selim 'Selim' Talat

The Philosophy Takeaway 'Mind & Body' Issue 35

A rebuttal: The False Dichotomy between the Mind and Brain. - By Elliott, E. 2012

A rebuttal: The False Dichotomy between the Mind and Brain.

This article is a rebuttal to Samuel Mack-Poole’s ‘The False Dichotomy between Mind and Brain’. It will outline and argue against two key claims in his article. Firstly that the mind is part of the brain, and secondly that thought is a physical process. I will then briefly outline what is empiricism and why empiricism can be used, not to refute mind, but to prove mind. Poole answers the question ‘what is mind’ using the following dictionary definition, “...the element, part, substance, or process that reasons, thinks, feels, wills, perceives, judges,...1.” So the mind is a thing that reasons, thinks, feels, wills, perceives, judges. Poole does not reject this definition, but says that it may be broadened. I don’t necessarily disagree here, but he doesn’t give an alternative definition so I will work with this one. He embeds mind in brain by favouring the following definition of brain. “The brain is a centre of thought, understanding, mind and intellect.”

So here, the mind is a: reasoning, thinking, feeling, willing, perceiving, judging thing and this thing is part of a material thing which is a centre of thought, understanding, mind and intellect. The first question which arises out of this picture is, how can a brain have a mind? How can a brain be the centre of mind? How does the mind orbit the brain if you will? Poole does not offer a causal account of mind and brain, but only that the brain seems to be the central substance. The phrase ‘the centre of’ here is a bit ambiguous. It is already very complicated at this stage and challenges the view that only people are thinking things.

In ‘Neuroscience and Philosophy’, Hacker and Bennett attack the field of Neuroscience by accusing Neuroscientists of being conceptually confused. It is people who think, feel, perceive and all those other things. They called these kinds of activities that people do ‘psychological predicates’ which can only be ascribed to people, for example ‘Fred is thinking about his cat’ or ‘Jay is remembering his anniversary’. It is not brains that understand, or parts of the brain, but people.

This same theme crops up in a paper on ‘The Distinction Between Mental and Physical Illness’, where Kendell argues that it is not the body that is sick, nor is it the mind that is ill, but the person. These types of critiques are based on Wittgenstein’s later works in the ‘Philosophical Investigations’ where he argues that it is the job of philosophers to see when people from different language games are importing the rules of another language game and say to them, ‘hey, you are operating outside of your language game’, or ‘you are breaking the rules of your own language game’; which is what Neuroscience is doing. Neuroscience can here be accused of stealing the language from what Poole argues, stems from a fantastical history. If Neuroscience is to be strictly scientific, that is base its conclusions on observations, than why is science still employing mind, or concepts that stem from a fantastical period? ‘Poole goes on to assert that thought, something which has brain as its centre, is a physical process. Now what is a physical process? A physical process isn’t a fixed state, but something that is comprised of parts which are causally linked through the dimension of time. This can get complicated here, but we will leave thinkers like Hume to the side at the moment. If we employ the term thought as a physical process, as Poole states is proved by science, then surely science should be able to show us thought. Well, can they? Can Science prove thought? I went ‘in my mind’s eye’ to a live operation by which the person was alive2. The clever surgeons carefully sawed through the subjects head in a semi circle and lifted up part of thesubject’s skull, like a skull cap. Underneath the blood and flesh we saw the brain, in the white light. Wow, amazing. Yet through the disgusting yellow and grey matter – where, Dr. Scientist, can you shown me this subject’s thoughts? The scientist then points to a bolt of electricity that momentarily makes the brain light up. ‘There it was- a thought’ exclaims the Scientist. But, to beg the question, is that a thought? Is a thought a flash of lightening in the brain? Ironically we may use lightening as a metaphor when we say we have been struck with an idea, but do we mean it literally? No. A bit of brain lighting up is not a thought.

Moreover, if I was to see someone’s thought, would it still be a thought, as usually what we mean by thought is something private, that only I can experience and not you. The scientist, by this qualification, could never show a thought for as soon as another observed ones thoughts it would cease to be a thought as it is no longer private, but publicly seen.

I think the definition of thought as physical process is wrong, yet a physical process may be a part of thought. I do not know if this is actually the case, but would suggest here that science does argue this – and even sometimes is as bold to give some kind of casual account which usually lands flat on its arse again. But thought is not electricity in the brain; it is not only a physical process.

The only other thing I will point out is the contradiction in his sentiments concerning empiricism. Empiricism –simply- is the doctrine which holds a number of arguments for the position that knowledge comes from experience. Now I won’t go into these arguments here as they are not important here. Poole implies in his article that if it is not in your experience or stemming from it then there is no proof. Besides from the fact that I can argue for mathematical or logical proofs as being alternative forms of proof, I will merely say that my experiences are only experienced by me, and your experiences are only experienced by you. They are idiosyncratic. Within my experience there are tables, chairs, trees and flowers, but there are also thoughts and feelings, memories and ideas. So, we do have empirical proof that thoughts and feelings exist, but these things are based on my experiences and not yours. I think Poole really wants to argue for a notion of truth called ‘endoxon’, truth is consensus. But this is naïve and depends on a correspondence theory of truth which can only be asserted and has no sufficient proof as of yet, nor will it ever. As, in order to prove a correspondence theory of truth, which quite simply states that if I can point to it, it is real, depends on us transcending our own self. We can only have our own experiences of something and cannot, as Kant argued, know something beyond the realm of sense data and the categories of the mind. I would go on, but I think I have successfully tackled two of the main problems in Pooles article. Firstly, by identifying the conceptual confusion, using Hacker and Bennett and latter Kendell, present in Poole’s article by ascribing psychological predicates to the brain. Secondly, by arguing that empirical proof is based on the account that only I can experience my experiences, and if experience is a sufficient criteria for truth then we can still have thoughts, memories and all those other things as different aspects of experience which do not have a material quality. There are a number of other confusions in the article which I have left, like the two definitions he compares and states are synonymous, are by definition not. The part is not the whole, the part in this case being mind and the whole the brain.

1. Whether other animals have mind, which is not what should be focused on here. 

2.  Let’s not for the time being argue qualifications of life as it will distract from the issue again at hand, albeit an interesting one.

By Elliott, E. 2012

The Philosophy Takeaway 'Mind & Body' Issue 35

Philosophical Tangents with Ashdotman & Socrates La Funkbadger

The First in the Series

http://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL1A2657A4879618C5

Art by Eliza Veretilo

This weeks artist was Eliza Veretilo: http://neonsuitcase.blogspot.co.uk/

The Philosophy Takeaway 'Open Topic' Issue 34

The latest philosophical fuss in education - By Patrick Ainley

The latest philosophical fuss in education

A big philosophical row is brewing in England’s primary schools about the knowledge (sophia – or is that wisdom?) that should be taught to 5-11 year-olds in the revised national curriculum.

The existing curriculum is accused by Conservative Education Minister, Michael Gove, of being too ‘skills’ based. The argument typically centres on history which is actually developed as a subject more at secondary school but relates to conservative cultural concerns. Traditionalists – like David Cameron with his plans to ‘celebrate’ the pointless slaughter of the first world war – feel history has become too ‘skills’-based. By that they don’t mean anything practical in the way of manual skills but that history and other teachers try to encourage pupils to think about cause and effect and why things happen. Instead of this generalized knowledge, the government wants pupils learning lists of kings and queens and the dates of imperial victories – bits of information pupils can learn by rote to recite in tests!

Gove justifies his prejudice in favour of this traditional type of schooling he enjoyed(!) by borrowing from a retired US professor, ED Hirsch. (That’s not Ed’ but his initials without punctuation, the sign of a true prawn – like AC Grayling, the former-London Uni philosopher who has set up his own traditionally academic private University). Hirsch claims that he tried to teach poor Black kids in community college about their history by informing them about the American Civil War. This basic factual information would, he argues, enable them to become knowledgeable about their own past and do as well as anybody else in – guess what? – more tests!

It’s not as if nobody had ever thought of or tried this before. In the 1960s French educational sociologist, Pierre Bourdieu, advocated what he called ‘rational pedagogy’ – booster classes for working-class and minority ethnic university students to help them to catch up with upper and middle-class students who had acquired through the way they were brought up the ‘cultural capital’ recognized by higher education. In England at the same time, educationalist Basil Bernstein argued that traditionally academic ‘Education could not compensate for society’. The implication was – and Bourdieu came to accept this too – that the education system would have to change to be of any use to the majority of the population it failed.

Although there were some pioneering experiments – especially in the old polytechnics in the UK – so that many more people were encouraged by progressive primary and comprehensive schools to go on to further and higher education, education as a whole since the 1976 so-called ‘Great Debate on Education’ was narrowed to only what was useful in employment. It became training without jobs as employment collapsed and the traditional skills of apprenticeships were reduced to making students ‘competent’ in carrying out basic tasks for – once again – more tests! (Nowadays we have education without jobs and apprenticeships that

are often indistinguishable from workfare.)

Meanwhile, schools compete to cram their pupils for an academic National Curriculum. Gove confuses tests of memory under pressure – like University Challenge – with ‘intelligence’. He thinks this is inherited so that all the education system has to do is pick out the ‘bright’ Men of Gold, just like in Plato’s Republic, failing the dull Men of Silver and Bronze. So Gove thinks you don’t need to train and educate teachers, for instance, because – so long as you know your academic subject – either you can teach it or you can’t. Anyone can therefore teach in Gove’s ‘free schools’ as they can in the private schools that are the model for them.

In fact, regurgitating disconnected bits of information in traditional exams is the equivalent of training for the competence-based assessment that replaced the real skills formerly acquired on apprenticeships. (Even state school teachers are ‘trained’ like this nowadays and the government last week proposed ‘competence tests’ for NHS doctors.)

Knowledge has thus been degraded to information and skill to competence so that there is now a hopeless confusion of terms and nobody knows what they mean any longer. Clearly a job for philosophers to sort out! As we do so, we should remember that there is nothing wrong with training; it is basic to putting the components of competent performance together in the exercise of a skill but you have to go beyond training to have education. (You can train animals after all but you can’t educate them!) But training for the assessment of competence is what much of education is being reduced to.

Similarly, Hirsch’s idea of education is cramming bits of information unrelated by conceptual and generalizable knowledge. ‘Funny phonics’ even teaches reading like this – training primary children to ‘sound out’ letters in words that make no sense which predictably inhibits reading for meaning. Meaning and imagination come in at the level of knowledge which is inseparable from skill because there is no knowledge so cerebral it does not draw upon some practical skill (since the mind is not separate from the body) and you need skill to apply knowledge.

Training for unthinking performance and schooling in the rote learning of information restricts pupils / students to their place in the hierarchy of competing institutions for which largely written exams function as proxies for cultural capital. This is what reforming the national curriculum is all about. Philosophers must contribute to resisting it!

By Patrick Ainley 

The Philosophy Takeaway 'Open Topic' Issue 34

Philosophical Train Journeys- Transcendentalism - By Eliza Veretilo

Philosophical Train Journeys- Transcendentalism

Train journeys are good places to accompany mental journeys. I wonder how many brilliant theories have been thought out through the window of a train, with a beautiful open country side landscape whizzing past outside. Silence makes us pensive and the constant change in the view makes us question, makes us wonder. Seems like the perfect setting to philosophise, if only in our minds. Alone with our thoughts we can reach that place, the place beyond remembering where we left the keys or what we are going to have for lunch. That place where we become immortal in thought.

This August, I discovered American Transcendentalism in Philosophy; it’s a beautiful doctrine from the 1830’ East Coast of America which believes in the inherent goodness of both humans and nature. They also claim that it is society and its institutions, especially the influence of organised religion and political parties, what are corrupting our essentially good nature. As if as children we were programmed to forget that part of our being, in order to maintain the previously existing society/economy. Transcendentalists believe that real individuals, who are independent minded and productive, are prone to show their goodness, instead of being the victims of fear. Thus if you are free minded and self-reliant, your true nature can be expressed, in its pure estate, thus the potential of who you could be, can be actualised. And then, a true community, formed of such individuals, can exist. Beautiful. When looking out through the window to the soft, beautiful and tender landscapes, and the taciturn faces of the rest of passengers whilst looking at the sunset, I wonder... Can we do that? Could we be that? Why people are not good to each other? We could be good to each other. Let’s be good to one another!

Some philosophical theories, such as this, do speak of a direct action. Transcendentalists criticise political parties, claiming that it makes the individual ultimately uninvolved with his/her community matters and a free minded person become nothing more that a number to vote, with the illusion of a voice. Having a voice over your small community could, perhaps, work better. Same with religion, which already tells you what is waiting for you in the afterlife before you can even attempt to live this one! Well, my fellow train passenger, the declaration of Human Rights was ultimately based on this the Transcendentalist theory, which claims that life is sacred and that we are good or have some sort of moral compass, if we only care to listen. A compass that can help us to live life deliberately, even if sometimes is easier to walk around with our eyes shut. Maybe there is something, something something to Transcendentalism. The train moves, time to eat, sleep, motive, organise, raise, recognise. We all have this dormant potential, if only we could stop the rush. To appreciate it and recognise it in one another could be the first step. Transcendentalism expresses the idea of a life lived like poetry, where you appreciate yourself and nature, where awareness if a gift and nature a blessing and we can build a world, were progress doesn’t look like destruction.

By Eliza Veretilo

The Philosophy Takeaway 'Open Topic' Issue 34

Think Critically

The Philosophy Takeaway 'Open Topic' Issue 34

ANTIDOTE FOR BABY FEVER

"If the act of procreation were neither the outcome of a desire nor accompanied by feelings of pleasure, but a matter to be decided on the basis of purely rational considerations, is it likely the human race would still exist? Would each of us not rather have felt so much pity for the coming generation as to spare it the burden of existence, or at least not wish to take it upon himself to impose the burden on it in cold blood?" - Arthur Schopenhauer

 
One of the most important - arguably, the most important - of the ethical questions which a generation may consider is that of the ethical tenability of human reproduction. After all, with few exceptions, we all bear within us the desire for procreation, at least instinctually - in males, lust, and women, maternity. One's answer to the question "should we reproduce" is pivotal - from the loins resounds the exhortation "Yes!"; from reason, "No!" At any rate, every generation has answered "yes", irrespective of whether the question was ever consciously considered; for most it is an implicit goal. But whom do we serve, when not our basest animal impulses, by answering this primordial call in the affirmative; what profit have we to gain in conjuring from nothing "a weak and sin-prone race, in order to hand it over to eternal damnation"?

If "rational" considerations furnish sufficient motive (e.g. advancing evolution, colonizing space, sating the curiosity drive and the lust for the other shore), then we are at least condemning multitudes to lifelong travail and suffering in the spirit of exploration - but the argument could be made that in the context of all human venture and enterprise hitherto, insofar as we have treated the courageous investigation of unknown vistas as an end in itself, the burden of history has impelled us. Indeed, the signal from heredity to every generation is one of exploration, expansion, exploitation. This justification has at least something of nobility to it; but radically few are those who found their decisions on these thoughts. Most blindly indulge their lust, either for copulation or for its ultimate product, and these lusts are never given the analysis they demand. But the rational among us can pose the question: is this really "right"?

Since foremost in one's contemplation of this problem must be the weighing of the sufferings of which the lives of all individuals are filled, I must take this as the chief criterion by which all judging of this problem be assessed; all other considerations are in my mind subordinate to this, for the spectrum of suffering is felt more immediately and more intensely by every living organism than any other phenomena, and often by orders of magnitude.  The manner in which most individuals approach this problem will often devolve upon the peculiar nature of his character and disposition, so that from the affable and easy-going man we may expect an affirmation of the rightness of reproduction, and from the depressive and anxious man a denial. But we seek not after an emotional assessment, encumbered by years of psychic baggage, but a rational one.

Without throwing the whole edifice of philosophy into question, I wonder not at the motives of philosophers, but at the breadth of vision they ultimately serve and the conclusions towards which they strive. It has been described as an "abnormal and thus superfluous exercise of the intellect"; if logic and rationality (the intellectual outgrowths of life), when turned inward upon the beings which devised them, yield the conclusion of the intrinsic vanity and futility of life (and therefore also of reasoning - at least of reasoning designed to account for the accomplishment of man's ends), how can we justify the perpetuation of our race?

Science, philosophy and all rational inquiry seem almost of themselves idle pastimes of beings who find themselves, suddenly, existing, without ever having wished to be, and who must do something with this existence so as to distract themselves from its monotony, insipidity, the thousand fold agonies visited upon everyone regardless of fortune, and the tyrannical absurdity of the whole. In this aspect life seems to be a penal colony, wherein our enslavement is an endless expiation of the guilt of our birth - the guilt of the innumerable generations, despite the pain and abasement characterizing their lives, assenting to continue the cyclical tragedies.

If we consider the drive to exploration and conquest the guiding force of procreation - the pursuit of our species of vaster and vaster frontiers of discovery - we subordinate the importance of the lives of all individuals to its realization. Yet, since these individuals are supposedly those who this exploration is ultimately designed to benefit, for whom is their altruism ultimately intended?

If we serve no other master than tireless exploration, expansion and dominance, how do we differ fundamentally from any other opportunistic species? How dissimilar then is the human race from an ant colony? What master do we serve when we strike out for the stars, declaring as our compass "discovery"?

To the entire question "to spawn, or not to spawn", I pose a humanistic syllogism: IF evolution produces in the higher animals greater receptivity to pain ("Pain is the origin of consciousness - Dostoevsky), AND pain is bad, THEN evolution is producing greater and greater quantities and magnitudes of pain THEREFORE life ought not to exist.

It is the "net pleasure vs. net pain" concept: since the net pain potential of this world (i.e., the total ways in which one could suffer and the frequency of this suffering) overwhelmingly outweighs that of its net pleasure potential, everyone - at least, every compassionate and empathic person - must agree that life is better off not existing.

"So just because a lot of life is suffering, that means life doesn't possess its own great pleasures? Doesn't the pursuit of joy and fulfillment justify these sufferings?" That is a matter to be answered on entirely personal terms, and a person cannot answer it 'til she has been born, and lived long enough to comprehend its implications. - - But her parents will already have committed the sin of birthing her, quite without consideration of the potential tragedies they were setting in motion, on nothing more than the gamble that she would answer in the affirmative.

[Quoted liberally and lazily from Schopenhauer]

Tyler Threske

The Philosophy Takeaway 'Open Topic' Issue 34

One axiom in logic for Aristotle’s three laws of thought

Aristotle has propounded three basic laws of thought:

(i)             Law of Identity,

(ii)           Law of Non-Contradiction,

(iii)          Law of Excluded middle.

To my mind these are in fact one law, when expressed in terms of formal logic.  But firstly let me return to my contribution to the previous issue (‘Axioms or Circularity’), where I argued that we needed axioms to avoid arguments which went ‘round and round in circles’.  I stated that we need at least one new axiom if we add a new concept.  Let us informally try this out:

- Negation.  Two negatives make an affirmative.

- One proposition.  p= p, p implies itself, p and ~ p (not p) cannot be true at the same time.

- Two propositions.  If p implies q, then if q is untrue, then p must also be untrue.

- Three propositions.  If p implies q, and q implies r, then p implies r. (transitivity)

My main concern here is with item1 – one proposition – but I would to look a little at items 2 and 3 first. If we look at the question of two propositions, an important concept is that a&b is equivalent to (and indeed implies) b&a.  This is known as commutativity, and of course goes on the tree of logic.  But this is a bit of a red herring: we know that meeting the love of your life and getting married is not the same thing as getting married and meeting the love of your life.  But logicians can show that this is saying the same thing as “If p implies q, then if q is untrue, then p must also be untrue.”  And this is the important thing for reasoning.

Likewise transitivity is important for reasoning:  “If p implies q, and q implies r, then p implies r.”  But associativity is also important for logicians, and also for mathematicians (along with commutativity).  But associativity is likewise a red herring for the layman – and perhaps the non-logician philosopher – since there’s always degrees of association!  Which of course is important for ethics in matters that are not black and white.

 

So both associativity, along with double negation, go on the Tree of Logic.  … :] Well let us now get back to the question of item 1, one proposition, where a proposition is equivalent to itself, implies itself, and cannot be true at the same time as its opposite. Let us look more closely at Aristotle’s three basic laws of thought:

(i)             Law of Identity,

(ii)           Law of Non-Contradiction,

(iii)          Law of Excluded Middle.

The Law of Identity simply states that a=a, where to say p=q means that to say anything about p will always be equally true of q.  Aristotle argues in Metaphysics, Book VII, Part 17, that “the fact that a thing is itself is the single reason and the single cause to be given in answer to all such questions as why the man is man, or the musician musical…”

The Law of Non-Contradiction states, according to Aristotle, that “one cannot say of something that it is and that it is not in the same respect and at the same time”, and relates to what I stated above, namely that p and ~ p (not p) cannot be true at the same time.  In formal logic this is represented by

~ (p & ~p)

But Aristotle is talking about what things are, so that we consider object x, and property A, we can never have a proposition of the form

~ (Ax & ~Ax)

i.e. x is both A and not A.

Now the Law of the Excluded Middle deals with exactly the same issue as above, but makes clear that if a reference is ambiguous, a proposition may appear to be both true and false at the same time, but there can be no contradiction in addressing the facts themselves.

But in all of this, the axiom ~ (p & ~p) is ever present, either in this form, or in the form  (p É p), p implies p.  For logicians (p É q) is by definition saying the same thing as ~ (p & ~p).  This is not so clear in natural language, since if I consider whether p implies q, then if p is in fact false, our immediate reaction is that we cannot tell.

And “p implies p” is the same thing as “p is equivalent to p” - since equivalence here means that p implies p and  vice versa!

As I said earlier, if we look at formalisms, it is useful to see how they apply to robust argumentation, and here the idea that p implies p can be expanded to the following three principles:

(i)             p is equal to and equivalent to itself,

(ii)           if we say that x is A, x cannot also be not A at the same time,

(iii)          but just to be precise, if we say that x is A, it cannot also be not A at the same time.

Note the very subtle difference between (ii) and (iii).

(iota being the affirmative operator ! )

Martin Prior

The Philosophy Takeaway 'Open Topic' Issue 34

Happy New Year

From all of us at The Philosophy Takeaway, hope you had an exciting Christmas and wishing you all a thought provoking New Year. 

Art by Eliza Veretilo

Art by Eliza Veretilo

The Philosophy Takeaway 'Open Topic' Issue 33